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Modern lotteries in the United States are run exclusively by state governments. In many 
cases, states establish separate lottery agencies to administer and promote the games. One 
statutory duty of many lottery agencies is to maximize the net revenue of the games, 
hence, all agencies engage in advertising. There is however constant pressure from state 
legislatures to reduce advertising budgets because of the concerns about the efficacy of 
advertising in increasing sales, as well as the distaste for the state government’s 
promotion of lottery. Existing literature suggests that the marginal effectiveness of 
advertising decreases as the quantity of advertising increases. To provide empirical 
evidence on whether an additional advertising dollar increases lottery sales, we examine 
quasi-experiments in three states (Illinois, Washington, and Massachusetts) where 
advertising budgets of state lotteries were exogenously curtailed by the state legislature. 
We find that the elasticity of advertising is 0.07-0.16, suggesting that a one-dollar 
decrease in advertising spending could cost the state government $9-10 of the net revenue 
at the margin. Contrary to the belief of some legislatures that state lotteries spend
    
too much on advertising, our results suggest that they may advertise too little in terms of 
maximizing the profit.   
Out of the thirty-eight states with lotteries, sixteen earmark lottery profits for 
primary and secondary education. Given the fungibility of money, economists have 
questioned the effectiveness of the earmarking policies. Using a panel data set of states 
with lotteries, we find that 60-80 cents out of an earmarked dollar is spent on public 
education. In contrast, each dollar of lottery profit increases school spending by about 50 
cents in states that deposit profits into the general fund, and by only 30 cents in states that 
earmark profits for areas other than education. Using a Bayesian estimation procedure for 
inequality restrictions in the normal linear least squares model, we find there is a high 
likelihood that a dollar of earmarked lottery profits generates less than a dollar of 
spending on K-12 education, but more than the spending generated from a dollar of 
lottery profits put into the general fund.
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Chapter 1: Overview 
 
Since 1964 when New Hampshire first started the state-wide sweepstakes, thirty-
seven other states plus Washington D.C. have legalized lotteries, with more states poised 
to follow.1 The resurgence of state lotteries is spurred by the increasing demand for more 
or improved public services and strong opposition to tax hikes. The legalization of 
lotteries tends to ripple within regions of the country. As one state starts a lottery, its 
bordering neighbors tend to follow suit in order to reduce the potential loss of tax 
revenues to their neighbor. In the thirty-eight states where lottery games are currently 
offered, lottery sales amount to about $38 billion a year. They contribute about $12 
billion to state coffers annually, accounting for 1.4 percent of the total state revenue, 
more than the tax revenue collected from sales of tobacco and alcoholic beverage 
together.  
The controversial nature of lottery profits has aroused public concerns on almost 
every policy issue related to it: whether a state should legalize the lottery, what programs 
lottery profits should benefit, whether lotteries prey on economically disadvantaged 
population, and how much state governments should allow lotteries to spend on 
advertisement. Some issues are fairly common in the public finance realm such as the 
effectiveness of earmarked revenues in increasing spending on designated programs; 
others are unique in the field of public finance, such as the determination of the proper 
scale of lottery advertisement by state government.  
                                                 




Although state lotteries have been in business for forty years, research on some 
issues related to state lottery policies is not ample. A comprehensive evaluation of the 
impact of state lotteries on citizens and governments is beyond the scope of this 
dissertation and requires academic investments from a variety of different fields in the 
social sciences. In this dissertation, I focus on two more limited but very important 
aspects of lottery operations. In the first half of the dissertation, I study the efficacy of 
advertising in increasing lottery sales, while in the second half, I estimate the impact of 
earmarked lottery profits on state educational expenditures.  
 
1.1 Is too much money spent on lottery advertising? 
Most lotteries are operated by a specific state government agency. One statutory 
duty of these agencies is to maximize the net revenue generated from lottery sales.2 To 
bolster profits, each state lottery agency engages in advertising. Advertising budgets are 
financed through lottery ticket sales but the budget must be approved annually by the 
legislature. Legislatures in some states are concerned that lottery advertising budgets are 
too high. Proponents of this view typically make two arguments in support of their case. 
First, some argue that lottery advertising has saturated the market and it no longer 
                                                 
2 Here are some examples of texts taken out of state lottery laws specifying such an objective. In Arizona 
Revised Statutes Title 5 Chapter 5 Article 1 5-504B, it is stated that “the commission shall oversee a state 
lottery to produce the maximum amount of net revenue consonant with the dignity of the state.” In Article 3 
Sections 8880.25 of California State Lottery Act of 1984 (California Government Code Title 2 Division 1 
Chapter 12.5), it is stipulated that “the Lottery shall be initiated and operated so as to produce the 
maximum amount of net revenues to supplement the total amount of money allocated for public education 
in California.” We also find the following text in Georgia Code Title 50 50-27-2 (3) that “lottery games 
shall be operated and managed in a manner which provides continuing entertainment to the public, 
maximizes revenues, and ensures that the lottery is operated with integrity and dignity and free of political 
influence.” In New Jersey State Lottery Law (N.J.S.A 5:9-7) it is also states that “…lottery shall produce 
the maximum amount of net revenues for State institutions and State aid for education consonant with the 




expands ticket sales. Second, others find it distasteful that states encourage participation 
in gambling.  
While this dissertation will have little to say about the second point, the first 
concern is obviously an empirical question. The existing literature on the impact of 
advertising on sales suggests that the marginal effectiveness of advertising decreases as 
the quantity of advertising increases, and that “saturation stages” are different for 
different products. To determine whether an additional advertising dollar increases lottery 
sales, we examine quasi-experiments in three states (Illinois, Washington, and 
Massachusetts) where advertising budgets of state lotteries were exogenously curtailed by 
the state. The basic estimation method employed is a difference-in-difference model. We 
measure changes in advertising spending and sales before and after the legislative 
decision to cut the budget, and determine whether both advertising spending and sales are 
lower during the treatment period. To obtain direct measurements of advertising effects 
such as elasticity of sales with respect to advertising, we also treat legislative decisions as 
instruments for advertising spending and apply the two-stage least squares method to 
combine the results above.  
We find that the reduction in advertising spending in these three states reduced 
lottery ticket sales. Our calculated elasticity of sales with respect to advertising ranges 
between 0.07-0.16. Though of different products, our estimated elasticity is in line with 
previous studies. For example, Seldon et al (1989) find that the elasticity of cigarette 
sales with respect to advertising is between 0.1-0.25, and Valdés (1993) reports an 




Contrary to the belief of some that too much is spent on lottery advertising, our 
results suggest that if the goal of a lottery agency is to maximize profits, most states are 
spending too little on advertising. We calculate the gross rate of return to advertisement 
and find that a one-cent decrease in monthly advertising spending per capita results in a 
decrease in gross sales of 31-37 cents. Assuming that thirty percent of sales are retained 
in state coffers as profit, a one-dollar decrease in advertising spending could cost state 
government $9-11 of net revenue at the margin.  
The results are not surprising since advertising expenditure accounts for only 1.17 
percent of total sales, an advertising/sales ratio that is much lower than other industries. 
For example, casinos on Las Vegas Boulevard spend 2.4 to 4 percent of the total hotel-
casinos’ revenues on advertising (Zheng 1999), restaurant owners spend 3.2 percent of 
their total revenues on advertising, beverage manufacturers 7.5 percent, cosmetics 
companies 8.8 percent, and candy makers 12.7 percent.3 State lotteries are constrained in 
means that could be used to maximize profits. In addition to the annual legislative review 
of advertising budgets, some states explicitly cap the advertising budget at a small 
percentage of gross sales in the legislation;4 some states stipulate that certain fraction of 
total sales should be returned to the public in the form of prizes.5 It is therefore not 
unreasonable that we find that state lotteries fall far down the advertising response curve 
away from the saturation stage. 
                                                 
3 The statistics is quote from the online information provided by the North American Association of State 
and Provincial Lotteries available from the World Wide Web: http://www.naspl.org/faq.html. 
4 Lottery advertising budget is capped at 4 percent of gross sales in Arizona, 3.5 percent of projected sales 
in California, 3.05 percent of lottery sales in Idaho, 1 percent of lottery sales in Iowa, 2.75 percent of gross 
sales in Minnesota, and 3.5 percent of projected sales in Oregon. 
5 For example, Michigan Lottery Act specifies that “not less than 45% of the total annual revenue accruing 
from the sale of lottery tickets or shares shall be apportioned for payment of prizes to the holders of 
winning tickets or shares.” The Act also stipulates that the lottery commissioner appointed by the governor 
shall promulgate rules regarding “(a) The type of lottery to be conducted. (b) The price of tickets or shares 





1.2 Is earmarked lottery profit fungible? 
Out of the thirty-eight states with lotteries, sixteen earmark lottery profits for 
primary and secondary education. Given the fungibility of money, many economists and 
political observers have questioned the effectiveness of earmarking policies. The 
fungibility of money is, however, rejected in a variety of empirical applications in public 
finance, most notably, the large literature on the “flypaper effect.” Whether earmarking 
increases spending is, in the end, an empirical question. In the second half of the 
dissertation, we address this issue by examining the experiences of lottery states in the 
past twenty years.  
Using a panel data set of states with lotteries, we perform three different sets of 
tests. First, we restrict our attention to the nine states that have always earmarked lottery 
profits for K-12 education, and examine whether year-to-year changes in state spending 
on education are correlated with changes in lottery profits over the same period. If 
earmarking increases spending dollar for dollar, the coefficient on per capita lottery 
profits in models where per capita K-12 spending is the dependent variable should equal 
1. Second, we examine states that switched the allocation of lottery profits between the 
general fund and public education during the sample period. If earmarking increases 
spending on education dollar for dollar, we should see an increase in K-12 spending 
commensurate with the amount of new monies allocated to the earmarked category once 
the profits were shifted to this category. In both of these tests, we use as a comparison 





In the third empirical model, we first model discrete events that should alter the 
lottery profits generated by states in “first-stage” regressions, then examine how K-12 
spending is correlated with these events in “reduced-form” models. Drawing on these two 
results, we can use these shocks as instruments for lottery profits in a two-stage least 
squares model and estimate what fraction of the marginal dollar produced in these events 
is spent on education.  
Given previous evidence on the “flypaper effect,” it is not surprising that we find 
up to three quarters of an earmarked lottery dollar finds its way to public schools. In 
contrast, each dollar of lottery profit increases school spending by about 50 cents in states 
that deposit profits into the general fund, and by only 30 cents in states that earmark 
profits for areas other than education. There is a high probability that a dollar of 
earmarked lottery profits generates more spending on K-12 schools than the spending 




Chapter 2: Lotteries in America 
 
In this chapter, we briefly review the history of lotteries in the America since the 
colonial time,6 and discuss the regulatory structure of modern state lotteries. We also 
sketch the evolvement of product lines of modern lotteries, and weigh the contribution of 
state lotteries to the general revenue budget of state governments.  
 
2.1 Brief History of Lotteries in America 
Lotteries are not new to America. They were used extensively during colonial 
times to fund a diverse set of public services and infrastructures such as roads, bridges, 
wharves, buildings, colleges, churches, libraries, lighthouses, and the Colonial army. For 
instance, the Virginia Company of London, the financier of Jamestown in Virginia, was 
permitted by the Crown to hold lotteries to raise money for the company’s colonial 
ventures.  
Lotteries were most active during the period following the adoption of the 
Constitution and prior to the establishment of effective means of local taxation in the 
1830s. From 1790 to the Civil War, fifty colleges, three hundred schools, and two 
hundred churches were erected with lottery proceeds. Among them were some of the 
nation’s earliest and most prestigious universities − Harvard, Yale, Columbia, Dartmouth, 
Princeton, and William and Mary. Between 1790 and 1860, twenty-four out of thirty-
                                                 
6 Detailed history on lotteries in the United States can be found in Clotfelter and Cook’s excellent book, 
Selling Hope: State Lotteries in America (1989). For a shorter discussion of the history and economic 




three states financed civic improvements such as courthouses, jails, hospitals, 
orphanages, and libraries through lotteries.  
During the first quarter of nineteenth century, the federal government begun to 
have access to revenue from tariffs, excise taxes on alcohol, and proceeds from sales of 
land. State and local governments could tax general property. Subsequently, the lottery 
gradually faded as a revenue source and taxation took its place in public finance. 
State and local governments ran most of the early lotteries in the United States, 
but during the nineteenth century, private companies were hired by governments to 
operate and market public lotteries. However, these privately run lotteries had some 
celebrated cases of fraud that eventually caused their downfall. For example, in 1823, 
Congress passed a private lottery for the beautification of Washington D.C. In the end, 
the organizers absconded with the proceeds and the winner was never paid. The most 
notorious case occurred in 1868 where Louisiana, like other Southern states, turned to 
lotteries to generate revenue to rebuild the war-ravaged region. The Louisiana Lottery 
Company was authorized by the state and granted a 25-year charter. A carpetbagger 
criminal syndicate from New York bribed the legislature into passing the lottery law and 
establishing the syndicate as the sole lottery provider. In 1895 when the lottery was 
disbanded, it was discovered that promoters had made huge ill-gotten gains.7 Concern 
about the corruption present in many games led states to prohibit state lotteries. By the 
end of the nineteenth century, thirty-five states had constitutional prohibitions against 
lotteries and no state permitted the operation of lotteries. 
In 1964, lotteries made their twentieth-century debut in New Hampshire. To avoid 
federal anti-lottery statutes, the lottery was modeled after the Irish sweepstakes and tied 
                                                 




to horse races. Winners are the lucky ones who purchased one of the few tickets tied to 
the horse who would win the race. Over the next six years, only one state, New York, 
adopted a lottery. In 1970, New Jersey started a “state” lottery. In contrast to the 
nineteenth-century model of privatized lotteries, the New Jersey Lottery was 
administered by a commission appointed by the Government, a model that most state 
lotteries follow today. Academic researchers usually recognize the New Jersey Lottery as 
the first modern state lottery. 
In the early 1970s, state budgetary problems coupled with growing opposition to 
tax hikes generated a rapid, coast-to-coast expansion in state-run lotteries. By the end of 
the 1970s, most northeastern states had established lotteries; states on the West Coast 
followed suit in the 1980s; southern states jumped on the bandwagon in the early 1990s. 
Today, lotteries are operated in thirty-eight states and the District of Columbia. In Table 
2-1, we list the states with lotteries and the years when lotteries began operation. 
 
2.2 State Monopoly of Lotteries 
 
2.2.1 Federal Regulation 
Since the notorious scandal of the Louisiana lottery, the federal government 
outlawed the use of the U.S. mail for lotteries in 1890 and in 1895, invoked the 
Commerce Clause to forbid the shipment of lottery tickets across state lines. As a result, 
Title 18 of the United States Code § 1301 - 1304 banned transporting or mailing of 
lottery tickets or related matter, together with advertisement of or information concerning 




In 1975, exceptions were provided to state lotteries. Section § 1307 was added to 
Title 18 Chapter 61, allowing lotteries and its advertising to be conducted within a state 
that legalized lottery. However, cross-border sales of lottery tickets are still outlawed. 
 
2.2.2 State Laws Regulating the Operation of Lotteries 
Modern lotteries have been the unique province of state governments. State 
lottery agencies are in charge of the daily operation. These agencies differ in their 
administrative nature. Out of the thirty-eight state lotteries, eleven are placed within an 
existing state department, usually in the state’s revenue department. The remaining 
twenty-three are established as separate organizations. We summarize in Table 2-2 the 
administrative nature of state lottery agencies and state codes regulating operations of 
lotteries as of 2003. The regulatory structures are remarkably similar across states. 
Despite minor variation in their administrative form, all state lotteries share a common 
subordination to the elected state legislature, with the responsibility for the form, goals, 
and operations of lotteries firmly in the hands of the latter.  
Each state grants its lottery agency a monopoly; no competitors are allowed 
within the state. Part of the impetus behind the exclusivity is to ensure that the state can 
capture monopoly profits. It is the statutory duty of the lottery agency to maximize net 
revenue. To fulfill this obligation, most of the lottery agencies are organized in an 





2.3 Lottery Product Mix 
The product lines of state lotteries have been evolving continuously over the past 
forty years. In December 1970, New Jersey Lottery offered the first 50-cent weekly draw 
lottery ticket of modern state lotteries. Each ticket was preprinted with a potential 
winning number combination that was determined at weekly drawings. The game was a 
passive drawing game since it did not require any effort of players except purchasing the 
ticket. It did not differ much from the games offered during the colonial time. To attract 
more purchases, new games have been invented that involve active play by players. Now, 
three major groups of games are offered: instant scratch games, online games, and video 
lottery games.  
In this section, we provide a general description of these games and track their 
evolution over the past forty years. Detailed descriptions on specific games can be found 
on web sites of state lotteries.  
 
2.3.1 Instant Scratch Games 
Massachusetts introduced the first instant scratch-off ticket in 1974. Tickets were 
sold to the public with vinyl-covered words or numbers. The covering can be easily 
scratched off with a coin, and the revealed words or numbers identify if the ticket holder 
wins a prize. Compared to the passive drawing games, the instant game offers players 
immediate gratification and immediate cash payoff from the authorized sales 





For years, most instant scratch off games had ticket costs of between fifty cents 
and one dollar. Beginning in the 1990s, states have instituted instant games with higher 
ticket costs, such as tickets of $2, $3, $5, $7 and $10. For example, Oregon offered its 
first $2 game, “Double Header,” in September 1990; Massachusetts introduced its first $5 
ticket, “Holiday Bonus,” in November 1992; Kentucky Lottery introduced “Surprise 
Package,” its first $3 instant ticket, in September 1996; and in November 1997 Michigan 
Lottery’s first $10 instant ticket, “$1,000,000 Gift,” went on sale with a top prize of 
$1,000,000. Payout ratios of the new multi-dollar instant games are usually higher than 
the original $1 game. 
 
2.3.2  Online Games 
An online game is a game where tickets are purchased through a network of 
computer terminals located at retail outlets. The terminals are linked to a central 
computer that records the wagers. Examples of on-line games include numbers games, 
lotto and keno. 
 
A.  Daily Numbers Games 
Lottery players wanted games in which they could actively participate by 
choosing their own numbers. In response, the New Jersey Lottery introduced the nation’s 
first online daily numbers game, “Pick-it,” on May 22, 1975. The daily numbers games 
allow players to choose their own three- or four-digit numbers, and to make various types 
of bets with different probabilities and payouts, through computer terminals. Today, all 




Maryland, daily numbers are drawn twice a day at noon and in the evening. In other 
states such as Massachusetts and Minnesota, the numbers games are drawn once a day, 
seven days a week. 
 
B.  Lotto Games 
Lotto was first introduced in Massachusetts and New York in 1978. The lotto 
game offered in Massachusetts was a pick of six numbers out of 49. If the player’s 
numbers match the numbers drawn, he or she wins a jackpot which is a share of the 
dollars played for that drawing. If there is no winner on a particular drawing, the jackpot 
is rolled over until the next period. In recent years as lotto games have grown in size, 
rollover jackpots have reached hundreds of millions of dollars. By now, every lottery 
state except Maine has its own in-state lotto game.  
Lotto profits are highly nonlinear in the size of the jackpot because the ticket sales 
grow quickly as jackpots rise. States with smaller populations have tried to exploit the 
benefits of large jackpot games by joining multi-state lotto games. In 1985, the first 
multi-state lotto game, Tri-State Lotto, was introduced in Maine, New Hampshire and 
Vermont. Later, in 1988, five states (Oregon, Iowa, Kansas, Rhode Island and West 
Virginia) plus the District of Columbia formed the Multi-State Lottery Association 
(MUSL), which has offered a series of multi-state lotto games. The most famous multi-
state lotto game is Powerball. The game was started in 1988 as Lotto*America and was 
changed to Powerball in 1992. Powerball is now played in twenty-six states, Washington 




that started in 1996. It is played in eleven non-MUSL states. In May 2002, the Big Game 
was replaced with Mega Millions.  
 
C.  Keno Games 
Keno was first introduced by the New York Lottery in 1988, and is now played in 
nine other states. Similar to a lotto game, keno allows bettors to choose a few numbers 
(how many is up to the player) out of a large set. Keno drawings are held more 
frequently, usually several times an hour. The game is mostly offered in lounges and 
bars. For example, the keno game offered in Maryland now allows players to select up to 
ten numbers from 1 through 80. The Lottery’s computer randomly chooses twenty 
winning numbers between 1 and 80 for each game of keno and displays those winning 
numbers on the Keno Information Monitor. Players win based upon how many winning 
numbers they match. Drawings take place every four minutes. 
 
2.3.3 Video Lottery Games 
Video lottery games are close relative of slot machines. Like arcade video 
machines, video lottery terminals (VLTs) are usually programmed to carry a wider 
variety of games, such as poker, blackjack, and bingo, and offer players the chance to 
play a game and win immediate payouts for winning bets. South Dakota is the first state 
to license and regulate video lottery games. Currently, VLTs are permitted in seven 





Most states introduce the lottery in stages where games with smaller payoffs such 
as the daily numbers and/or instant scratch-off games are offered first. Then, after a time, 
they introduce the larger-payoff games such as lotto or even a multi-state lotto. Instant 
games, daily numbers games, and lotto games are offered in all state lotteries, while keno 
and VLTs are only permitted in selective states due to concerns that such high-frequency 
games may entice some to play more than they can afford. 
 
2.4 Who Plays the Lottery? 
Much of the public concern about lotteries comes from the belief that playing 
lottery places a burden on economically disadvantaged population. Using the survey of 
Gambling Impact and Behavior Study 1997-1999 conducted by the National Opinion 
Research Corporation, Clotfelter et al (1999) estimate the demographic and 
socioeconomic patterns of lottery players, and conclude that lottery expenditures 
represent a much larger burden on household budget for low-income families than for 
those with high incomes. They find that although lottery participation rates increase with 
respect to household income, players with income less than $50,000 spend a larger 
fraction of their income on the lottery than players from other income categories, the 
lowest income category (households with income less than $10,000) has the highest per 
capita spending of $597. They also find that the degree of involvement is highly 
concentrated in a small fraction of players. The top 5 percent of players account for 54 
percent of the total sales, and the top 20 percent account for 82 percent of the total sales.  
Lottery play also differs systematically among demographic groups. They find 




women. Singles spend less on lottery plays than married or divorced people. Spending 
per player increases with age; per capita spending is the highest for the middle-age 
category of 45-64. Though participation rates are almost identical across ethnic groups, 
average spending by blacks who play is much larger than for other groups. Participation 
rates do not differ much by education, but spending by players drops as the player's 
educational attainment goes up. In summary, they find that males, blacks, high-school 
dropouts, and people in the lowest-come category are heavily over-represented among the 
top 20 percent of lottery players. 
This is clearly a regressive mechanism to raise taxes. However, the regressivity 
may be restrained somewhat once we add the expenditure side of lottery finance into 
consideration. Since all lottery profits are collected into state coffers and are expected to 
be spent on public services, it is possible that those heavy players also benefit more from 
the existence of lotteries. This is more likely to be true when lottery profits are earmarked 
for specific purposes and where the earmarking policy has a discernible impact on state 
spending pattern. 
 
2.5 Lottery Profits: a Special Revenue Source for State Government 
The expansion of lotteries across states and the innovation of new games 
produced a rapid growth in lottery sales nationwide. In Figure 2-1, we graph total lottery 
ticket sales and profits. The growth in the size of state lotteries has been staggering. In 
FY1970, when only New Hampshire and New York ran lotteries, total ticket sales 
amounted to $201 million. In FY2000, the total sales reached $34.0 billion, about 0.4 




State lotteries are one of the fastest growing segments of the legal gaming 
industry. As we can see in Table 2-3, lottery net revenues (gross revenue minus payout) 
were $3.6 billion (in terms of 1996 dollars) in 1982, constituting 20.8 percent of legal 
gaming net revenues. The net lottery revenues were about half the net revenues taken in 
by Nevada and Atlantic City casinos and a little bit shy of net revenues generated from 
horse racing. In 2000, lottery net revenues were slightly below $16 billion, accounting for 
28.1 percent of industry net revenues. Net revenues from lotteries are greater than any 
other segment of the industry, such as Nevada and Atlantic City casinos, horse racing, 
Native American gambling and riverboat casinos.  
For every dollar of lottery ticket sales, about 50 cents are paid back to players as 
prizes, 20 cents are spent on administration costs and retailers’ commission, and the 
remaining 30 cents are returned to the state government as net proceeds. Though highly 
profitable, lottery profits only account for a small share of total state revenues. In 
FY1998, lottery profits constitute only 1.4 percent of total state revenues in states with 
lotteries, which are of the same scale as the state property tax; or the sum of state tobacco 
and alcohol taxes and liquor store profits. By contrast, state general sales tax and income 
tax each accounts for about one fifth of total state general revenue.  
 
2.6 Lottery Profits Increase Spending on Public Goods  
As a source of state revenue, the lottery is often compared to other tax instruments 
in term of economic efficiency. Some scholars question whether it is an entirely fair 
comparison. Clotfelter et al (1987) suggest that we compare the legalization and 




legalization of lotteries enlarges the consumption bundle set of individual consumers and 
creates consumer surplus, lotteries are welfare-enhancing.8  
Because the purchase of lottery tickets is voluntary, no deadweight loss is created 
when the state government is allowed to have access to lottery profits. Pigou's conjecture 
suggests that a move to less distortionary taxation would lead to greater expenditure on 
public goods. Hamilton (1986) proves in his model that grants from higher-level 
governments will result in increases in local spending above those which increased 
consumer incomes would produce if the federal taxes create less distortion than local 
taxes. Following the same logic, we would expect that the less distortionary lottery 
profits generate an increase in spending on public goods above the level of public 
spending without lotteries.  
Morgan (2000) also predicts higher spending on public goods out of lottery 
profits, while he compares lottery profits to voluntary contribution schemes. State 
governments wishing to increase revenues face implicit or explicit limitations on the 
taxation schemes available to them, such as Proposition 13 in California and the Headlee 
Amendment in Michigan, two major initiatives that greatly reduced the dependence on 
property tax. The resurgence of state lotteries is a response to public resistance to any sort 
of tax increases. Under such situation, Morgan (2000) argues that lottery profits may not 
be a substitute for confiscatory tax instruments when these are politically feasible; rather, 
lotteries are often used in lieu of other voluntary contribution by private charities and 
governments when taxes are not feasible. Comparing lottery with other voluntary 
schemes, Morgan shows in his model that lottery is a practical way of overcoming the 
                                                 
8 The conclusion is based on assumptions that individuals have full information on lottery products and 




free-rider problem in the decentralized allocation of public goods. His findings suggest 
that relative to voluntary contributions, lotteries increase the provision of the public 
goods, improve welfare, and provide levels of the public good close to first-best as the 
lottery prize increases. 
We should note that lottery profits account for less than 1.5 per cent of total state 
revenues. Even if the theoretical prediction of increased spending on public goods holds 




Chapter 3: Over- or Under-Advertising by State Lotteries 
 
3.1 Overview 
As was noted in Chapter 2, state lotteries were commonplace during the 1800s. 
But unlike current lotteries, private firms typically ran these lotteries. A series of scandals 
forced these lotteries to shut down and there were no state lotteries for about eighty years. 
The modern lottery was reintroduced in New Hampshire 1964, and since then, thirty-
seven other states plus Washington D.C. have started state lottery games. Learning from 
the lessons from the notoriously privately-run lotteries in the last century, state 
governments formed special government agencies to be responsible for the operation of 
lotteries. In many states, the statutes establishing the lottery specify that the duty of the 
lottery agency is to maximize net revenue. To fulfill its obligation, all state lottery 
agencies engage in advertising. Advertising budgets are financed through lottery ticket 
sales, but the advertising budget must be approved annually by the legislature.  
State legislatures often find themselves conflicted about the appropriate level of 
the advertising budget. Most state lottery charters stipulate that lottery agencies should 
maximize the net revenues to the state so it is no surprise that lotteries advertise. Some 
legislatures claim that advertising is the driving force in the growth of lottery sales, and 
suggest that advertising levels are too low given new competition from other forms of 
gambling such as riverboat and Native American casinos. They claim that any decision to 
cut advertising budgets is equivalent to killing the goose that lays golden eggs. In some 
states, however, legislatures are concerned that states are advertising too much. The 




lottery advertising has saturated the market and no longer expands ticket sales. Others 
worry about the moral implications of advertising by the state lottery – should states be 
encouraging their residents to gamble?  
Determining the budget for lottery advertising is an important issue because it 
could impact the millions of dollars of revenues the state government takes in annually 
from lottery sales. In the thirty-eight states where lottery games are offered, lottery sales 
amount to about $38 billion a year. They contribute about $12 billion to state coffers 
annually, accounting for 1.4 percent of the total state revenue, more than the tax revenue 
collected from sales of tobacco and alcoholic beverage together.  
There is no clear-cut evidence that state legislatures can rely on in determining the 
proper size of the lottery’s advertising budget. Existing literature assumes that the 
marginal effectiveness of advertising decreases as the quantity of advertising increases. 
The advertising response curve is assumed to be either S-shape or concave (Little 1979, 
Rao et al 1975, and Vakratsas et al. 2004). Sales are said to enter into the saturation stage 
when the marginal effect of advertising becomes asymptotically zero. If the advertising 
expenditure of the state lottery lands on the rising segment of the advertising response 
curve, an extra dollar on advertisement could bring in more sale. However, if it enters 
into the saturation stage where the response curve is flat, further spending on advertising 
will not increase sales significantly. Existing literature suggests that saturation stages are 
different for different products (Rao et al 1975). It is therefore an empirical question to 
determine whether an additional advertising dollar will increase lottery sales.  
There have been quite a few academic and industry studies examining the impact 




competitive or oligopoly market, where the advertising expenditures of other firms could 
affect sales of the firm directly or indirectly through strategic interactions. Because 
federal regulation prohibits sales of lottery tickets across state borders, each state lottery 
agency is a monopoly within its territory. There is little competition among state lotteries 
for each other’s market, and therefore advertising campaigns are not employed as a non-
price competition strategy. Consequently, we can safely assume away any interaction 
among state lotteries that is of first order significance in the determination of advertising 
expenditures, and treat each state lottery as an independent observation.  
Furthermore, since sales of lottery tickets across state borders are outlawed, the 
increase in sales generated from more advertising will come mainly through market 
expansion and not re-allocation of market shares. This is in contrast to much of the 
existing literature on advertising and market shares that has a difficult time determining 
whether the positive covariance between advertising and market share is attributable to 
the expansion of market or re-arrangement of existing customers.  
The unique market structure of the lottery industry mentioned above greatly 
simplifies our econometric model. However, there are other features of state lotteries that 
complicate the analysis. In many states, advertising budgets for lotteries are a specified 
fraction of the previous year’s sales. Therefore, a simple regression of lottery sales on 
advertising would be subject to an omitted variable bias. This potential endogenous 
relation between sales and advertising was first pointed out in Schmalensee (1972). To 
identify the impact of advertising on ticket sales, we utilize discontinuities in advertising 
expenses generated by state regulations as an exogenous source of variation in 




advertising in three states in just this manner. As we outline in detail below, the 
legislative decisions to reduce advertising were not related to any projected change in 
lottery sales. Therefore, we can treat the events as quasi-experiments and estimate their 
impact on lottery sales.  
For example, the Washington State Lottery eliminated TV commercials during 
the summers of 1993 and 1994 in order to test the effectiveness of advertising on sales. In 
Massachusetts, State Democratic Senator Thomas F. Birmingham waged a fierce public 
battle with Republican Treasurer Joseph D. Malone over lottery advertising since early 
1993. After a three year crusade, the lottery’s advertising budget was cut from $11.6 
million in FY1993 to $5.6 million in FY1994, to $2.8 million in FY1995 and had been 
capped at $400,000 a year since FY1996. Although Democrats claimed the cut “positive 
not personal,” Republicans deemed it “a slap at Joe Malone.” In January 1999, George 
Ryan was sworn in as the Governor of the state of Illinois. To finance his $12 billion 
“Illinois First” public works projects, TV advertising campaigns of the State Lottery were 
reduced in FY2000 and FY2001. Some press hinted that Lori Montana, the Lottery 
Director appointed by the former governor, was being dealt a bad hand. 
We examine the three quasi-experiments separately in the paper. The basic 
estimation method employed is a difference-in-difference model. We first measure 
changes in advertising spending and sales before and after the legislative decision to cut 
the budget, and determine whether both advertising spending and sales are significantly 
lower during the treatment period. Comparing the impact that the negative shock has on 
advertising and sales could produce some indication of the change in sales due to a 




treat the legislative decision as an instrument for advertising spending, and apply the two-
stage least squares method to obtain direct measurements of advertising effects on sales. 
The key in the difference-in-difference analysis is identifying what would have 
happened to advertising and sales absent the intervention. These values are estimated by 
including data on states with no such change in advertising policy as control states. The 
selection of control states is critical in the evaluation of the quasi-experiments. Given that 
we are studying cases where the advertising spending pattern was interrupted 
exogenously, we first use as controls those states that trend similarly as the treatment 
state both in sales and advertising before the interruption. Then, we exclude states that 
share borders with the treatment state to rule out possible neighborhood effects between 
the state and its neighbors.  
We also select control states according to their game structures. For example, 
Mega Millions (the Big Game), a multi-state lotto game, is offered in the three treatment 
states. Illinois and Massachusetts joined this multi-state lotto game when it was started in 
September 1996. Washington joined later in September 2002. Seven other states also 
started offering the Mega Millions game during the sample period from 1992 to 2002. 
We thus include in the control group those states that offer the Mega Millions game 
before or at the same time as the treatment state. The state lottery of Washington and 
Massachusetts also offer keno games with ten other states. Similarly, we use as controls 
those states that offer keno games before or at the same time as the two treatment states. 
For Illinois, state lotteries without keno games are included as controls. For the purpose 




We find significant reductions in both advertising expenditures and sales in the 
three quasi-experiments. In Illinois, monthly advertising spending per capita is reduced 
by 2.5 cents during the TV commercial restriction period, a reduction of 40 percent from 
the pre-restriction mean; and monthly sales per capita fall by 9 percent. The estimated 
semi-elasticity of sales with respect to advertising is 4.05. The calculated elasticity of 
sales with respect to advertising is 0.16, which suggests that a one percent decrease in 
monthly advertising spending results in 0.16 percent decrease in sales per capita. In the 
state of Washington, we find that monthly per capita spending on advertisement falls by 
2.5 cents during the summer TV hiatus, a reduction of 70 percent from the non-treatment 
mean, and lottery sales drop about 16 percent. The estimated semi-elasticity with respect 
to sales is 6.41; the calculated elasticity of sales is 0.08. In the case of Massachusetts, we 
find that monthly advertising spending per capita falls by 6.8 cents after 1994, almost a 
complete elimination of advertising. Monthly sales of traditional online games fall by 
22.8 percent after 1994. The calculated elasticity is 0.01, which implies that a one percent 
decrease in advertising spending results in 0.01 percent decrease in sales of traditional 
online games.  
However, the estimates may not be accurate if we do not consider the persistent 
effect of advertising. Most of the literature recognizes that advertising expenditures may 
not have their full impact on sales in the period when they occur. The depreciation rate of 
advertising effects varies across products. After surveying more than seventy published 
results, Clark (1976) finds that the effect of advertising on sales of mature, frequently 
purchased, low-priced products has a high depreciation rate: 90 percent of the cumulative 




advertisement could be short-lived if the advertising is game-specific and informative, 
such as providing information on the current size of the jackpot or the prize structure of a 
new scratch game. Advertisement of this type becomes obsolete quickly when the jackpot 
rolls over or the scratch game phases out. On the other hand, the effect of advertisement 
could be long-lived if advertising changes the preferences of a random citizen and turns 
him or her into a more frequent player. Although some state laws suggest that the 
advertisement of lotteries should focus on provision of game information, we do not have 
enough data to separate the impact of informative advertisement from persuasive one. 
Thus, our estimated depreciation rate is the combined effect of both types of 
advertisement. Following the estimation method employed in Berndt et al (1995), we find 
evidence that 90 percent of the effect of lottery advertising depreciates after six months. 
The dependent variable in our analysis is a panel of monthly lottery sales at the 
state level. A simple Durbin-Watson test suggests the existence of serial correlation 
within each state. Although the existence of serial correlation does not affect the 
consistency of our estimates, the standard errors calculated using ordinary least squares 
are not robust. To correct the serial correlation in the panel analysis, we follow the 
estimation method provided in Anderson & Hsiao (1982) and report the corresponding 
robust standard errors in regression results.  
This chapter proceeds as follows. We first review some previous research 
studying the impact of advertising on sales, and then describe the dataset used in the 
analysis. In the fourth section, we present background information from local press 
and/or state legislative publications on the three quasi-experiments to support our claim 




the econometric models and explain in detail how we select control groups for each 
treatment state. In this section, we also describe how we estimate the depreciation rate of 
advertising and how we correct for serial correlation of monthly sales within each state. 
Estimated results are presented separately for each treatment state in the sixth section. We 
draw conclusions in the final section. 
 
3.2 Literature Review 
Literature studying the relation between advertising and sales is abundant. 
However, there is no published study examining the impact of lottery advertising on 
ticket sales. A comprehensive review of the whole advertising literature is beyond the 
purpose of this paper. Instead, given the quasi-experiments we examine in this paper, we 
focus on studies that examine the impact of government regulation of advertising on 
sales.  
A fair amount of literature examines whether advertising restrictions for tobacco 
and alcohol have reduced aggregate consumption of these products. A number of 
researchers pooled cross-national time series data from the OECD countries over the time 
period of 1960 to 1990 to estimate the impact of various advertising bans and restrictions. 
The results from these analyses are mixed. Some (Laugesen et al 1991, Saffer 1991, 
Saffer et al 2000, 2002) find advertising bans reduce cigarette or alcohol consumption by 
a statistically significant amount, while Stewart (1993) and Nelson (2003) find that 
advertising bans have no effect on cigarette consumption.  
In early studies, most authors treated the enactment of advertising bans as an 




an advertising ban could be endogenous. Likewise, Saffer et al (2002) finds evidence that 
alcohol consumption has a positive effect on total advertising bans, while Nelson (2003) 
finds that a decline in smoking prevalence among males leads to stronger restrictions on 
cigarette advertising. Taking into consideration the endogenous enactment of bans, Saffer 
et al (2002) still finds a statistically significant negative effect of advertising bans on 
alcohol consumption. Nelson (2003) finds that advertising bans have no effect on 
cigarette consumption.  
In Washington State Lottery Report 95-6, the Legislative Budget Committee of 
Washington State conducted a study of the Washington State Lottery and found that the 
TV advertising hiatus during the summer of 1993-94 resulted in a potential loss in sales 
of $4.5 million. The report also found that the presence of TV advertising positively 
influences sales. 
In this paper, our identification comes from discontinuities in advertising 
expenditures due to government regulations. But such regulations are not as prevalent 
across states as the cigarette and alcohol advertising bans in OECD countries that are 
discussed above. We therefore study the quasi-experiments on a case-by-case basis. We 
claim that the discontinuities can be treated as exogenous variation and provide detailed 
information in section 3.4 to support the claim. In the literature on advertising bans, the 
strictness of bans is measured by the number of media banning advertising. However, it is 
questionable whether bans on the same media are comparable across different countries. 
The literature gave little attention to whether bans lower advertising spending. If the 
authors could obtain data on advertising spending of sample countries and provide some 




efficacy of bans in reducing advertising expenditures, the estimated results would be 
more convincing. In this paper, we provide statistical evidence and regression results on 
changes of advertising spending due to government regulations in the treatment states. 
We are able to estimate the sales elasticity with respect to advertising using two-
stage least squares (2SLS). However, the estimates will not be accurate without 
considering the persistent effect of advertising. Most of the literature recognizes that 
advertising expenditures may not have their full impact on sales in the period when they 
are incurred. Nerlove and Arrow (1962) assume that advertising builds a stock of firm-
specific goodwill that affects both current and future consumption. To estimate the 
persistence of advertising impacts, assumptions about the depreciation process are 
required. The typical assumption is that a fixed fraction of the advertising effects in this 
period is retained in the next period.  
One commonly applied method to estimate depreciation rates is to replace the 
cumulative effects of all the previous advertising with the lagged dependent variable. The 
coefficient on the lagged dependent variable is the estimate of the persistent effect of 
previous advertising. This method is called the Koyck transformation. Detailed 
descriptions of Koyck model and the derivation of estimable equations from Nerlove-
Arrow model can be found in Clark (1976), Bass et al (1983), Blattberg et al (1981), and 
Rao (1986). Although the Koyck model is widely applied in the estimation of advertising 
depreciation, some critics argue that the Koyck model can also represent habit-persistent 
behavior not necessary related to advertising (Clark 1976).  
To pin down the depreciation of advertising effects, Berndt et al (1995) estimate 




where they include lagged advertising expenditures in the regression and restrict the 
coefficients on the lagged advertising variables so that effects of lagged advertising 
depreciate exponentially over time. In this paper, we follow the method used in Berndt et 
al (1995) to estimate the depreciation of the effects of lottery advertising.  
 
3.3 Data 
The data set used in this paper is compiled from different sources. Monthly lottery 
sales data are aggregated from weekly sales data obtained from some state lottery 
agencies9 and La Fleur’s, a private company that provides lottery data for the United 
States and a number of European countries. The data contain monthly sales of the thirty-
seven state lotteries from 1992 to 2002. For most of the states, we have a full panel of 
observations over the sample period.10  
The advertising data were more difficult to obtain. For a number of states, we 
requested advertising budget records from state lotteries directly. Though some agencies 
keep records of annual advertising budget, records of the monthly spending on 
advertising are unavailable. Therefore, we obtained the monthly advertising spending 
data of state lotteries from Competitive Media Reporting (CMR). CMR is a private 
company that monitors advertisements that appear in fifteen different media nationwide 
and provides occurrence and expenditure data on advertisement of certain brands or 
products. The lottery advertising expenditure data provided by CMR cover media such as 
                                                 
9 We want to express our special thanks to Lisa McDonald, from the Media Relations of Massachusetts 
State Lottery, for her kind help to provide us the lottery sales data of Massachusetts.  
10 For states such as Georgia, Nebraska, New Mexico, and Texas where lottery did not start until after 1992, 
the panel is considered complete in the sense that monthly sales are reported after the lottery initiated. Sales 
data are missing for Colorado and Indiana in 1992, Minnesota in 1993, Louisiana in 1994 and Rhode Island 




TV, radio, magazine, newspaper and outdoor service. On average, spot TV advertising 
accounts for about two thirds of the total lottery advertising expenditure; outdoor service, 
spot radio and local newspaper consume the rest. Some of the state lotteries also run 
commercials in national newspapers and nationally syndicated television shows, but these 
are infrequent outlets for state lottery advertising dollars.  
Using the CMR data, we are able to construct a panel of monthly advertising 
spending by state lotteries and break down the spending by various media. The 
calculation of the CMR advertising expenditure data is based on the occurrence of 
advertisement in CMR-tracked media and on the advertising rate per unit estimated by 
CMR. Thus the data do not add up to the state advertising budget figure. Comparing the 
annual advertising budget obtained from some of the state lotteries, we find that the 
aggregate expenditure figure calculated using monthly data from CMR is generally 
smaller. The result is not surprising considering that some of the state budget will be 
spent on consultants, running the state advertising office, etc. However, we are reluctant 
to gauge the extent of underestimation using data from CMR because the annual 
advertising budget records from state lottery agencies are not comparable across states.11  
The introduction of new games is an important factor that affects lottery sales. 
During the 1980s, all state lotteries offered at some point three types of games: instant 
game, daily numbers and lotto games. The 1990s saw a blossoming of new games. For 
example, instant tickets are offered in face value of $2, $3, $5, $7 and $10 in addition to 
the traditional $1 ticket. Some states adopted keno. Almost all state lotteries joined at 
                                                 
11 Some state lotteries record the allocated budget ex ante, some record the advertising expense ex post. It is 




least one of the multi-state lotto games to take advantage of the larger jackpot sizes.12 To 
account for the different game structures of state lotteries, we construct a set of dummy 
variables representing the introduction of each new game during the sample period. The 
variables include three dummy variables that equal 1 for the first, second, and third 
month separately after the introduction of the game, and a fourth dummy variable that 
equals 1 for the rest of months after the introduction of the game. The step structure of 
the dummy variable is designed to capture some of the non-linear effects on sales of new 
games. Information on game structures are obtained from various publications and web 
sites of state lotteries. 
Another factor that also affects ticket sales is the jackpot size in games such as 
lotto. Cook et al. (1993) argues that lotto sales increase with the scales of operations 
presumably because that sales are sensitive to the size of the jackpot and that larger 
jackpots come with a larger population base. The authors estimated the elasticity of lotto 
sales in Massachusetts with respect to the jackpot to be 0.35. Using lotto sales data from 
New York State, DeBoer (1991) finds evidence that the relation is not linear: lotto sales 
accelerate as jackpots grow. To account for such a non-linear relation, we collect data on 
jackpot sizes of the two largest multi-state lotto games: Powerball and Mega Millions 
(the Big Game),13 and include polynomial terms of the jackpot size in regression models.  
The sample contains 4682 monthly observations of thirty-seven lottery states from 
1992-2002. Variables in dollars are deflated using CPI-Urban index from the Bureau of 
                                                 
12 The only two states not offering multi-state lotto games are California and Florida. 
13 Special thanks to Dr. Melissa Kearney from the Department of Economics of Wellesley College, who 
kindly shared her data on jackpot sizes of lotto game. Special thanks to Ms. Dot Colvin from Maryland 
State Lottery, who provided data on recent jackpot sizes of Mega Millions from 2000 to 2002. Special 
thanks to Mr. William Sawchuck, from DC Lottery, who provided data on recent jackpot sizes of Powerball 




Labor Statistics. The base month is January 1996. All variables are in per capita term. In 
Table 3-1, we summarize the sample characteristics. Monthly sales per capita average 
$10.45, while advertising spending per capita is about 4 cents per month. Large standard 
deviations of monthly sales and advertising spending suggest heterogeneous performance 
of lottery agencies across states.  
State unemployment rates in the sample panel are monthly observations collected 
from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. State personal income per capita is the monthly 
average calculated using quarterly state personal income (SPI) from the Bureau of 
Economic Analysis (BEA). The rest of the state demographic features included in the 
sample panel are annual observations of state population, state population by age, gender, 
race, Hispanic origin, education level, marital status, and SMSA status. All demographic 
data are collected from the Census Bureau. 
 
3.4 Background Information on the Three Quasi-experiments 
Because lotteries are operated by state governments, their advertising practices 
are not regulated by the Federal Trade Commission. However, all the lottery states adopt 
formal laws or establish standards or guidelines as to what is appropriate for lottery 
advertising. Some states even explicitly cap the advertising budget at a certain percentage 
of gross sales in the legislation. The average advertising/sales ratio of lotteries across 
states is kept at a fairly low level compared to other industries. According to National 
American Association of State and Provincial Lotteries (NASPL), “in 1996 North 
American lotteries spent $400 million on advertising and received $34 billion in sales. 




owners spent 3.2 percent of their sales on advertising, beverage manufacturers 7.5 
percent, cosmetics companies 8.8 percent, and candy makers 12.7 percent. Advertising 
accounts for less of the cost of a lottery ticket than virtually any other consumer 
product.”14 Casinos on Las Vegas Boulevard spend 2.4 to 4 percent of the total hotel-
casinos’ sales on advertising (Zheng 1999). 
Although state lotteries are self-funded and self-governing, their advertising 
budgets must be approved by state legislatures. In many states, there is constant pressure 
to suppress the lottery advertising. Some legislatures find it distasteful that public funds 
are used to promote gambling while others question the efficacy of advertising in 
increasing sales. In some states, the lottery advertising budget has been explicitly reduced 
by the state legislature. 
During the 1994 legislative session, the legislature of Washington State directed 
the Legislative Budget Committee to conduct a study of the Washington State Lottery. To 
determine the effectiveness of lottery advertising, the State Lottery of Washington 
eliminated TV advertising for three to four months during the summer of 1993 and 1994. 
In 1993 the hiatus was 13 weeks and in 1994 the hiatus was 17 weeks.15 Although we 
label the data from the three states we examine as quasi-experiments, the events in 
Washington were in fact an experiment! 
In the state of Massachusetts, the debate over the size of the lottery advertising 
budget became more confrontational than in any other state. Beginning in 1993, State 
Senator Thomas F. Birmingham (D-Chelsea), Ways and Means chairman, waged a fierce 
                                                 
14 From http://www.naspl.org/faq.html#lotadver. 





public battle with Republican Treasurer Joseph D. Malone over lottery advertising.16 
Senator Birmingham successfully fulfilled a three-year crusade and persuaded the 
legislature to cut the Lottery’s advertising budget from $11.6 million in FY1993 to $5.6 
million in FY1994, to $2.8 million in FY 1995 and cap the lottery advertising at $400,000 
a year since FY1996 and restrict the use of the money to in-store displays only.17 
Birmingham argued that he was motivated only by a conviction that the lottery was 
overspending on “tawdry enticement” to poor, gullible people.9 Although the Senate 
President William Bulger said the cuts were “positive not personal,”18 Senate Republican 
leader Brian O. Lees of East Longmeadow dismissed these arguments noting that the 
democratic senate approved lottery advertising budgets of up to $14 million annually 
when Democrat Robert Q. Crane was the treasurer in the 1980s. Lees said, “This is a slap 
at Joe Malone, pure and simple.” Birmingham acknowledged Malone “is not the most 
popular person among legislators,” but said that should not protect him from legitimate 
budget cutbacks.19 As a result, the advertising budget of the Massachusetts State Lottery 
had been capped at $400,000 since FY1996, was down to a little more than $100,000 a 
year in FY2003.20 The advertising budget is back to $5 million after Senator 
Birmingham’s departure at the end of 2002.  
The third legislated reduction in advertising that we consider happened in the 
State of Illinois. In January 1999, George Ryan was sworn in as the Governor of the state 
of Illinois. To finance his $12 billion “Illinois First” public works projects, the new 
                                                 
16 “Senate proposal guts lottery ad budget,” by Peter J. Howe, the Boston Globe, 06/08/1994. 
17 “Lottery ad budget hits a new low: Funding cutback drops Mass. to lowest in the US,” by Peter J. Howe, 
the Boston Globe, 06/14/1995. 
18 “Malone blasts plans to curtail Lottery ads,” by Peter J. Howe, the Boston Globe, 06/22/1993. 
19 “Lottery cut survives Senate budget debate, Day 1,” by Peter J. Howe, the Boston Globe, 06/14/1994. 





governor proposed tax hikes on liquor and vehicle fee increases, as well as an expansion 
of the state’s ability to borrow money.21 Amid the increases in fees and “sin tax” hike, the 
advertising budget of the State Lottery also felt the pressure to become leaner. On May 
13, 1999, Dave Urbanek, the gubernatorial spokesman, said that although there was 
disagreement on whether all TV advertising would be cut, officials have decided that the 
current level of advertising (referring to television) is too much. On the same day, lottery 
spokesman Mike Lang disputed claims that all TV advertising would be curtailed after 
the new budget goes into effect on July. But he admitted that lottery is cutting about $5.5 
million from its overall $23 million marketing budget. At the suggestion of gubernatorial 
officials, the State Lottery of Illinois did a major overhaul of the marketing scheme.22 
Some press hinted that Lori Montana, the Lottery Director appointed by the former 
governor, was being dealt a bad hand since the legislature cut the Lottery’s advertising 
budget and decreased their appropriations.23  
The most recent example of legislative cut of lottery advertising is found in 
Missouri24 where the advertising budget has been cut consecutively for two years since 
2003. The Missouri case is left out here because our sample only covers the period from 
1992 to 2002. 
                                                 
21 “Governor signs tax increases, bonding authority for Illinois FIRST,” AM Cycle, the Associated Press 
State & Local Wire, 06/15/1999. 
22 “Lottery ads will be pared,” by Kurt Erickson, the Pantagraph, 05/13/1999. 
23 Chicago Sun-Times, 08/03/1999. 
24 “In the FY2002, the lottery received $8.25 million for advertising. This year that was cut to $6.25 
million. Lawmakers, noting that sales have remained fairly steady, decided that the lottery could make do 
with even less advertising money for next year. The proposed budget for fiscal 2004 would reduce lottery 
advertising to $3.05 million. House members initially had sought an even larger cut but were persuaded by 
Senate negotiators to accept the roughly 50 percent reduction.” “Luck runs out on lottery ads,” by David 






3.5 Econometric Models 
 
3.5.1 Difference-in-Difference Estimation 
To measure the impact of advertising reduction on lottery sales, we would like to 
compare sales of the treatment state lottery in the period when the advertising budget was 
reduced to sales that the state lottery would have produced during that period had the 
budget not been curtailed. A simple comparison of sales before and after the treatment 
could produce a biased estimate of the treatment effect if we are unable to control for 
factors that occur at the same time as the treatment. To estimate the counterfactual 
growth of sales that would have occurred in the treatment state in the absence of the 
interventions, we include other non-treatment lottery states in the comparison group. We 
hope that by carefully selecting comparable control states, we are able to project the 
counterfactual change in sales of the treatment state using the estimated change in sales 
of the control states before and after the treatment. This is a standard difference-in-
difference model that compares the change in sales of the treatment state before and after 
the treatment to the estimated change in sales of control states. To determine the impact 
of the advertising restriction on sales, we estimate the following equation: 
 
S iym = θ*D iym + β1X iym + β2Z iy + u i + v y + w m + ε iym   (3-1) 
 
The dependent variable S iym is the natural log of monthly sales per capita of state 
i, in year y and month m. D iym is the treatment dummy variable of interest, which equals 




effect, which measures percentage change in sales of the treatment state during the 
treatment period. u i, v y, and w m represent state, year and month fixed effects, ε iym is the 
error term. 
There is substantial variation in monthly sales per capita both across and within 
state lotteries. The average monthly sales of all state lotteries are $10 per capita. While 
the State Lottery of Massachusetts ranks at the top with monthly sales of $41, the State 
Lottery of Montana ranks in the bottom with monthly sales of $3. To account for the 
unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity in lottery sales across states, we include state 
fixed effects in the regression. Monthly fixed effects are included to filter out the 
seasonality of sales, and year fixed effects to control for shocks to sales that are common 
to all state lotteries but vary across years, such as national recessions.  
X iym is a vector of covariates capturing state economic features and lottery 
characteristics that could affect sales. The state economic characteristics included in Xiym 
are the natural log of monthly state personal income per capita25 and the monthly state 
unemployment rate. To capture the impact of introduction of new games on sales, we 
include in X iym a set of dummy variables that represents whether a state operates a game 
in a particular month. Some of the new games introduced during the sample period are 
keno,26 Tri-state Win Cash,27 the Big Game,28 Powerball,29 Daily Million,30 Cash 4 
                                                 
25 Monthly state personal income per capita is calculated from quarterly SPI from BEA. 
26 California, Colorado, Georgia, Kansas, Massachusetts, Maryland, New York, Washington, West Virginia 
offered keno games at different point of time in the sample period, Michigan, Oregon, and Rhode Island 
offered keno before 1992. 
27 Tri-State Win Cash started in Maine, New Hampshire, and Vermont in April 1992. 
28 Georgia, Illinois, Massachusetts, Maryland, Michigan, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Virginia, and 





Life,31 Rolldown,32 Hot Lotto,33 Tri-West Lotto,34 Lotto South,35 2By2,36 and higher-
stakes instant games with ticket costs of $2, $3, $5, $7 and $10.37 We also include in Xiym 
the jackpot size of the two most popular multi-state lotto games − Powerball and Mega 
Millions (the former Big Game). To capture the nonlinear relation between sales and the 
size of jackpot, we include polynomial terms of the jackpot size of order three. 
We include in Z iy state demographic variables observed annually such as age, 
gender, and racial composition of the state population, share of state population of 
Hispanic origins, education attainment of the state population, share of state population 
married, and share of state population lived in the SMSA areas. 
It is important to demonstrate the effectiveness of legislative decisions in reducing 
lottery’s spending on advertising. We thus apply the same difference-in-difference 
estimation to monthly advertising expenditures. The estimated equation is the following: 
 
A iym = φ*D iym + α1X iym + α2Z iy + u i + v y + w m + µ iym   (3-2) 
 
A iym represents the per capita monthly spending on advertising of state i, in year y and 
month m. The variable is not in log terms because of zero advertising for some state 
                                                                                                                                                 
29 Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, Georgia, Louisiana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Mexico, 
Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin joined the Powerball consortium during the sample period at different point 
of time. 
30 The game was offered in Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New 
Hampshire, New Mexico, Rhode Island, South Dakota, West Virginia, and Wisconsin in 1996-98. 
31 The game was offered in Deleware, Indiana, Iowa, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, 
Rhode Island, South Dakota, West Virginia, and Wisconsin in 1998-2000. 
32 Rolldown was offered in Deleware, Idaho, Iowa, Louisiana, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, New 
Hampshire, South Dakota, and West Virginia in 2000-02. 
33 Hot Lotto was offered in Iowa, Minnesota, Montana, New Hampshire, South Dakota, and West Virginia 
in 2002.  
34 Tri-West Lotto started in Idaho, Montana, and South Dakota in February 1994.  
35 Lotto South started in Georgia, Kentucky, and Virginia in September 2001. 
36 2by2 started in Kansas and Nebraska in June 2002.  




lotteries in some months. All the covariates in equation (3-1) are included in the 
regression of advertising spending. µ iym is the error term. The coefficient φ estimates the 
reduction in monthly advertising spending of the treatment state during the treatment 
period.  
 
3.5.2 Two-Stage Least Squares Estimation 
What we are interested in measuring is the effect of advertising spending on sales. 
Using the panel data, we could estimate equation (3-3) directly.  
 
S iym = λ*A iym + γ1X iym + γ2Z iy + u i + v y + w m + ω iym  (3-3) 
 
However, the estimated coefficient λ would overstate the effect of advertising since 
advertising spending is a function of sales. The consistent estimate of λ can be obtained 
using the two-stage least squares method where we employ the quasi-experiments as 
exogenous shocks to advertising spending. In the 2SLS estimation where A iym is 
instrumented with D iym, predicted advertising spending enters into the estimation of 
equation (3-3).  
The coefficient λ estimated using 2SLS can be thought of as a local average 
treatment effect that measures the change of sales with respect to advertising for the 
treatment state during the treatment period. Another way to think about equation (3-2) is 
that the estimated effect φ is the “first-stage” relation between the negative shock of the 




a negative shock to lottery advertising should eventually lead to changes in lottery sales. 
The estimated effect θ in equation (3-1) can be thought as the “reduced-form” relation 
between the negative shock and lottery sales. Comparing the impact that the negative 
shock has on advertising and sales should produce some indication of the percentage 
change in sales due to a marginal dollar reduction in advertising spending as a result of 
the treatment.  
 
3.5.3 Estimation of Advertising Depreciation 
Although we have identified three quasi-experiments that can be used to identify 
an equation such as (3-3), the estimated semi-elasticity in equation (3-3) may not be 
accurate without considering the persistent effect of advertising. Most of the literature 
recognizes that advertising expenditures may not have their full impact on sales in the 
period when they are incurred. We should include previous advertising spending in the 
regression in order to estimate the persistent effect. There is no rule of thumb to 
determine how many periods of lagged advertising spending should be included. Some 
studies assume the number is infinite and apply a Koyck transformation to substitute the 
effects of all lagged advertising with the lagged dependent variable. The coefficient on 
the lagged dependent variable is thus an estimate of the carry-over effect of advertising. 
Although the Koyck transformation simplifies the estimation, the coefficient on the 
lagged dependent variable can also be an estimate of habit persistence not related to 
advertising at all. 
Other studies assume that carry-over effects of advertising are statistically 




during that period. Clark (1976) finds that 90 percent of the cumulative effect of 
advertising on sales of mature, frequently purchased, low-priced products depreciates 
within three to nine months. We assume that the cumulative effect of lottery advertising 
depreciates completely within a year and include the monthly advertising spending of the 
previous year in the regression. Following the estimation method employed in Berndt et 
al (1995), we assume that a fixed fraction of the effect of current advertising retains in the 
next period, and estimate the retention rate using non-linear two-stage least squares 
method. The estimated equation is the following: 
 




iymj ] )(A Lag*[
j
jδ  + γ1X iym + γ2Z iy + u i + v y + w m + ε iym     (3-4) 
 
Lagj (A iym) is the j-month lag of current advertising spending per capita, the 
maximum number of lagged advertising included in the regression is 11. The coefficient 
δ measures the retention rate of the advertising effect. The coefficient λ0 is the estimated 
short-term semi-elasticity of sales with respect to advertising. 
Instruments for Lagj (A iym) are the treatment dummy variable D iym, and the 
interaction of the treatment dummy variable D iym with Lag (j+12) (A iym), the twelve-
month lag of each of Lagj (A iym) in the regression. Given the conventional wisdom that 
advertising effects depreciate completely within a year, the twelve-month lag of current 
advertising spending does not have any direct effect on current sales, which qualifies it as 
a potential instrument for the current advertising spending in the regression equation (3-
4). Similarly, the twelve-month lag of Lagj (A iym) where j =1, … , 11 can also be used as 




retention rate of advertising (δ) of the treatment state as a result of the treatment, we use 
the interaction of the treatment dummy variable with the twelve-month lags as 
instruments. 
 
3.5.4 Correction for Serial Correlation in the Error Terms 
Analyzing a panel of high-frequency data such as the monthly lottery sales at state 
level, we are concerned with possible serial correlations of residuals within state. 
Although the existence of serial correlation does not affect the consistency of our 
estimates, the standard errors calculated using the ordinary least squares method are not 
robust. To obtain robust estimates, we follow the econometric method suggested by 
Anderson & Hsiao (1982) in the estimation of models with serial correlation and report 
robust standard errors in the corresponding estimated results.  
The method is a multi-step procedure.  
• Step 1, we estimate equation (3-3) assuming the error terms are i.i.d., and 
obtain estimates of residuals.  
• Step 2, we estimate the serial correlation coefficients by regression current 
residuals on its lagged terms.  
• Step 3, we apply the estimated serial correlation coefficients to the 
dependent variable and all the covariates, and obtain a panel of “serial-
correlation-corrected” variables.  
• Step 4, using the “serial-correlation-corrected” panel data, we re-estimate 
equation (3-3) and report estimates of both coefficients and robust 




The estimates are asymptotically efficient when the number of time series 
observations tends to infinity. Proofs on properties of the estimates are available in 
Anderson & Hsiao (1982). Although we include state fixed effects in the regression to 
represent time-invariant difference in per capita lottery sales, we are concerned about the 
heteroscedasticity across states, and allow the serial correlation coefficients to vary across 
states.38 
 
3.5.5 Selection of Control States 
The comparison states for each of the three treatment states are selected separately 
according to various standards. Because the advertising spending pattern of the treatment 
state was interrupted exogenously during the treatment period, we first select as controls 
those states that trend similarly as the treatment state in sales and advertising before the 
interruption. Specifically, we pair the treatment state with any other state with lotteries 
except Massachusetts, Illinois and Washington, and keep the time series observations 
before the legislated reduction in advertising. Then, we estimate the following equations: 
 
S iym = ρ*T + τ* (O iym*T) + β1X iym + β2Z iy + u i + v y + w m + ε iym (3-5) 
 
A iym = σ*T + υ* (O iym*T) + α1X iym + α2Z iy + u i + v y + w m + µ iym (3-6) 
 
                                                 
38 We also estimate standard errors using cluster method. Saffer et al (2000) and Saffer et al (2002) 
compute standard errors with Huber or White estimator using country as the cluster variable to correct the 
serial correlation. However, the estimated standard error is asymptotically efficient only when N (the cross 
sectional units) tends to infinity. Angrist & Lavy (2002) and Wooldridge (2003) provide evidence that this 
procedure does not work well when panels numbers in the 40s or 50s. Given that our data contain limited 





where T is a monthly trend variable, O iym is a dummy variable that equals 0 for the 
treatment state and 1 for the other lottery state. Covariates in X iym and Z iy are the same 
as in equation (3-1) and (3-2). The estimated coefficient ρ measures the common time 
coefficient of sales in the two states, while the estimated coefficient τ detects whether 
sales of the other state trend differently. Similarly, υ tells us whether advertising 
spending trends differently in the two states. If both τ and υ are not statistically different 
from zero, we include the candidate state in the control group.  
Although each state lottery is a monopoly within its territory, some may be 
concerned that the state lottery may respond to the advertisement of its neighboring state 
lottery in order to attract players across the border and/or keep players within the border. 
The volume of cross-border sales could be large for areas such as DC Metro area since 
Maryland, D.C., and Virginia all run different lotteries and have a different collection of 
games. However, we do not believe that the volume of cross-border purchases is large 
enough in our three treatment states (Illinois, Massachusetts, and Washington) that it 
could trigger advertising competition among neighboring lotteries. To be on the safe side, 
however, we exclude from the control group those states that share borders with the 
treatment state.  
As a second method to select control states, we pick as comparisons those states 
that have the same mix of games. All state lotteries offer three types of games: instant 
scratch game, daily numbers, and lotto. The first major difference across states is which 
multi-state lotto consortium it belongs to. Among a dozen of the consortia, Powerball and 
the Mega Millions game (the former Big Game) enroll the largest number of member 




America. Our three treatment states belong to the Mega Millions consortium. The state 
lotteries of Illinois and Massachusetts joined the Big Game in September 1996. The 
Washington State Lottery joined later in September 2002. Control states are therefore 
selected among the members of Mega Millions consortium: four states that joined the 
consortium in September 1996 are included as controls for Illinois and Massachusetts,39 
three states that joined the consortium later around 2002 are included as controls for 
Washington.40 
The second major difference in game mix across states is whether the state lottery 
offers keno games. Massachusetts and Washington are among the twelve states that offer 
keno games, while Illinois belongs to the rest of state lotteries without keno games. The 
State Lottery of Washington began to offer keno on November 1992. Massachusetts 
started at the beginning of 1994. States that offered keno games before or at the same 
time as either of them are included in the corresponding control group.41 State lotteries 
without keno games are included as controls for Illinois State Lottery. For the purpose of 
completeness, we also include in the control group all the other state lotteries except 
Illinois, Washington, and Massachusetts. 
 
3.6 Estimated Results 
We first discuss regression results from the two quasi-experiments in Illinois and 
Washington. The case of Massachusetts is analyzed later since it is more complicated. 
                                                 
39 The other four Lotteries are Georgia, Maryland, Michigan, and Virginia. 
40 The three states are New Jersey, New York, and Ohio. 
41 The controls for Massachusetts are California, Kansas, Maryland, Michigan, Oregon, and West Virginia. 





3.6.1 Estimated Impacts of TV Commercials Restriction in Illinois  
In Figure 3-1, we plot the monthly advertising expenditure per capita for the 
Illinois State Lottery. As we can see, per capita spending on TV commercials as well as 
the total per capita expenditure on advertisement were greatly reduced during the period 
of July 1999 to June 2002. Monthly spending on TV advertising shrank 78 percent (from 
5 cents per capita to 1 cent per capita). Although the State Lottery compensated for the 
reduction in TV advertising by more than doubling expenditures on other media, total 
monthly advertising spending dropped 32 percent (from 6 cents per capita to 4 cents). 
Monthly sales per capita are plotted in Figure 3-2. During the period of less TV 
advertisement, monthly sales decreased by 20 percent (from $11 per capita to $9).  
We should note that total monthly spending on advertising did rise sharply in May 
2000 and May 2002. The first hike was the result of the largest lottery jackpot ever 
offered in North American history ─ $363 million from the “Big Game”. The second 
occurred when the “Big Game” was renamed “Mega Millions” in May 2002. In the 
regression models, we control for game structures of different lotteries as well as jackpot 
sizes of two major multi-state lotto games ─ Powerball and Mega Millions.  
In Table 3-2, we compare average monthly sales and advertising spending before 
and after the TV commercial restriction. We find that average monthly spending on TV 
advertising and total advertising are significantly lower after the restriction. Average 
monthly sales also fall short compared to the average before the restriction. All the 




We notice that in Figure 3-2, sales seem to trend downward during the whole 
sample period. We thus apply the interrupted time series analysis to the time series data 
of Illinois State Lottery to determine if sales and advertising expenditure trend further 
downward after the TV commercial restriction. The regression equations are as follows: 
 
S ym = c + ϕ*T + π * (D ym*T) + ε ym      (3-7) 
 
A ym = c + η*T + ι * (D ym*T) + µ ym      (3-8) 
 
S ym is per capita sales of Illinois State Lottery in natural log in year y and month m. A ym 
is per capita advertising spending of Illinois State Lottery in year y and month m. T is the 
monthly time trend. D ym is the dummy variable that equals 1 during the TV commercial 
restriction period and 0 otherwise.  
The estimated time coefficients are reported in the upper panel of Table 3-3. 
Though advertising spending trends significantly downward during the TV commercial 
restriction period, the negative trend in sales during the treatment is not statistically 
significant. In the lower panel of the table, we report the Durbin-Watson (D-W) test 
statistics on serial correlation among residual terms. The statistics suggest the existence 
of serial correlation in the error terms. Though we cannot determine the order of serial 
correlation solely based on the D-W statistics, it seems that monthly advertising spending 
follows an AR (1) process, while monthly sales per capita follows an autocorrelation of 




We apply the D-W tests to the time series data of sales of other state lotteries 
allowing the maximum order of autocorrelation to be 13. In some states, the first 
significant D-W test statistics occurs at order 1, while in most states, the first significant 
D-W test statistics occurs at order 2 or 3. It is counter-intuitive that we encounter the 
irregular autocorrelation pattern of monthly sales. If we assume the purchase of frequent 
players follows an AR (1) process, there should exist some mechanism that alters the 
buying pattern. Such mechanism could come from promotion tactics employed by state 
lotteries. To promote sales, some lotteries offer purchase of advanced plays. For example, 
Arizona state lottery allows players to purchase tickets for online games such as “Fantasy 
5” in advance for twelve consecutive drawings (which last for more than a month). 
Illinois state lottery allows its players to subscribe to online lotto games. The subscription 
offers players to pick their numbers for 26/52/104 consecutive drawings (which lasts for 
a quarter/half a year/a year). Massachusetts state lottery offers season tickets at a 
discounted price such as $25 for 26 consecutive drawings, $50 for 52 drawings, and $100 
for $104 drawings. Such promotion techniques reduce the transaction costs for frequent 
players, which could alter their buying pattern correspondingly. We therefore observe the 
abnormal pattern of autocorrelation in lottery sales in those states. The pattern of serial 
correlation across states lines up fairly well with the advance purchase scheme offered by 
state lotteries. Later in the estimation of robust standard errors, we assume the residuals 
follow AR (3) to accommodate for all possible serial correlation patterns. 
Using as controls those states with similar pre-treatment trends in advertising 
spending and sales as the Illinois State Lottery, we apply the difference-in-difference 




model are reported in the upper panel of Table 3-4. The left column records estimates 
using OLS method. The “first-stage” estimate of the treatment effect is obtained from the 
regression of equation (3-2), the “reduce-form” estimate is obtained from the regression 
of equation (3-1), and the 2SLS estimate from equation (3-3).  
Our results suggest that monthly advertising spending per capita are reduced by 
2.3 cents during the restriction period, a reduction of 40 percent from the pre-restriction 
mean, and monthly sales per capita fall by 10 percent. The estimated semi-elasticity of 
sales with respect to advertising is 4.24, which suggests that a one-cent decrease in 
monthly advertising spending per capita results in 4.24 percent decrease in sales per 
capita. All the estimated effects are statistically significant at a p-value of 0.05. 
In order to compare our estimated results with results from other literature, we 
calculate in Table 3-5 the elasticity of sales with respect to advertising by multiplying the 
estimated semi-elasticity with the average monthly advertising expenditure per capita 
during the treatment period. The elasticity calculated is 0.16, which suggests that a ten 
percent decrease in advertising spending results in 1.6 percent decrease in sales. We also 
calculate the gross rate of return to advertising in the last raw of Table 3-5. A one-cent 
decrease in monthly advertisement spending per capita decreases sales by 38 cents.  
To correct the serial correlation and heteroscedasticity in error terms, we apply 
the estimation method suggested in Anderson & Hsiao (1982) and report the robust OLS 
estimates in the right column of Table 3-4. The estimated coefficients are essentially the 
same as they are in the left column. The robust standard errors are larger than their 
counterparts in the left column as we have expected. The “reduced-form” and the 2SLS 




In the lower panel of Table 3-4, we exclude the neighboring states of Illinois from 
the control group and apply the same estimation procedures to the smaller dataset. The 
“first-stage” estimates are almost identical to the results in the upper panel. The “reduced-
form” estimate of the effect on sales and the 2SLS estimate of the semi-elasticity are 
essentially the same as their counterparts in the upper panel. 
In Table 3-6, we estimate equations (3-1) - (3-3) using as controls observations 
from states that offer a similar mix of major games. In the upper panel, four states 
(Georgia, Maryland, Michigan, and Virginia) that joined the Big Game Consortium at the 
same time as Illinois are in the control group. In the lower panel, twenty-two states that 
do not offer keno games are in the control group. Although the estimated impacts of TV 
commercial restriction in the “first-stage” and “reduced-form” regressions are different 
from the estimates in Table 3-4, the 2SLS estimates of semi-elasticity are similar. 
For the purpose of completeness, we report in the upper panel of Table 3-7 
estimates using all lottery states except Massachusetts and Washington as controls, and in 
the lower panel estimates using all non-neighboring states except Massachusetts and 
Washington as controls. All the estimates are statistically significant at a p-value of 0.05. 
The point estimates of the semi-elasticity are almost twice the size of their counterparts in 
Table 3-4. The estimated standard errors also double the size of their counterpart in Table 
3-4. 
As we have discussed in the previous section, our estimate of the semi-elasticity 
of sales with respect to advertising is not precise if the effects of advertising last more 
than one month. To measure the persistent effects of lottery advertising, we estimate the 




month lag of advertising among the covariates, and gradually increase the number of 
lagged advertising included to eleven. The convergence criterion of the iteration process 
is set at 1E-7. We report the estimated retention rate (δ) in Table 3-8. Including 
advertising expenditures of the past twelve months in the regression, our estimate of the 
retention rate of advertising is 0.627 with a p-value of 0.06. The estimates are fairly 
stable if we include advertising spending of the past eight, nine, ten, and eleven months 
into the regression. 
The estimate suggests that 62.7 percent of the effect of current advertising is 
carried over to the next month. After two months, 39.3 percent of the effect is retained.42 
After six months, only 10 percent of the effect is left.43 In other words, 90 percent of the 
cumulative effect of advertising depreciates within six months. Our estimated results here 
line up fairly well with previous studies surveyed in Clark (1976), which suggest that 90 
percent of the cumulative effect of advertising on sales of mature, frequently purchased, 
low-priced products depreciates within three to nine months.  
The effects of lottery advertisement could be short-lived if advertising is game-
specific and informative, such as providing information on the current size of the jackpot 
or information on the prize structure of a new scratch game. Advertisements of this type 
become obsolete quickly when the jackpot rolls over or the scratch game phases out. On 
the other hand, the effect of advertisement could be long-lived if the advertisement 
changes the preferences of a random player and turns him or her into a frequent player. 
Although some state laws suggest state lotteries should only advertise game information, 
we do not have enough data to separate the impact of informative advertisement versus 
                                                 
42 The cumulative effect of current advertising after two months is calculated as 0.627 2 = 0.393. 




persuasive one. Thus, our estimated retention rate is the combined effect of both types of 
advertising.  
The estimated short-term semi-elasticity is 1.405 at a p-value of 0.22, which 
suggests that a one-cent decrease in advertising spending leads to 1.4 percent decrease in 
current sales. If we sum up the cumulative effects of advertising over six months, a one-
cent decrease in current advertising spending could cause sales fall by 3.54 percent in the 
long term.44  
 
3.6.2 Estimated Impacts of Summer TV Hiatus in Washington  
The summer TV hiatus of lottery advertisement occurred both in 1993 and 1994 
in the State of Washington. In Figure 3-3, we plot monthly per capita spending on 
advertising for the Washington State Lottery from 1992-1994. In this graph, the solid 
horizontal lines are average total monthly advertising spending per capita before and 
during the summer hiatus separately. Before the summer TV hiatus, total monthly 
advertising expenditure averaged 4.2 cents per capita. During the hiatus, per capita 
spending dropped to 1.2 cents, a 71 percent reduction. TV advertisement fell by about 95 
percent from 3.8 cents per capita to about 0.2 cents per capita. It should be noted that 
expenditures on non-television advertising (such as radio, billboard, and print) increased 
during the same period from 0.4 cents per capita to 0.9 cents per capita.  
In Figure 3-4, we plot monthly sales per capita of the State Lottery of Washington 
from 1992 to 1994. The solid horizontal lines represent average monthly sales per capita 
                                                 





before and during the summer hiatus separately. The monthly average sales per capita fell 
from $6 before the hiatus to $5.37 during the hiatus, a reduction of about 11 percent.  
In Table 3-9, we compare the average monthly sales and advertising spending per 
capita of the Washington State Lottery in and out of the summer hiatus. Total spending 
on advertising during the summer hiatus is significantly lower than in the rest of the 
sample period, presumably because of a sharp reduction in TV commercials. Compared 
to the rest of the sample period, advertising spending on other media goes up during the 
hiatus summers, but the increase is not statistically significant at the 95 percent level. 
Lottery sales fall flat during the hiatus, but the difference is not statistically significant. 
We then apply the interrupted time series analysis to the time series data of 
advertising expenditures and sales of Washington State Lottery, and report the estimated 
coefficients on the time trend variables in the upper panel of Table 3-10. The estimated 
equations are (3-7) and (3-8). We are able to detect a significantly negative trend of 
advertising spending during the period of TV hiatus, and a negative but statistically 
insignificant trend of sales in the treatment period. The D-W test statistics in the lower 
panel suggest that monthly advertising expenditures are AR (1). No statistically 
significant auto-correlation is detected in residuals of sales series. We should point out 
that in this sample data, there are few states that exhibit no serial correlation. 
In Table 3-11, we report the difference-in-difference estimates of the effects of 
TV hiatus on advertising spending and sales together with the 2SLS estimates of the 
semi-elasticity of sales with respect to advertising. The first month of the summer TV 
hiatus occurred in July 1993. We are not able to select control states according to the pre-




lottery before the treatment. Thus, we use all state lotteries as controls in regressions in 
the upper panel, and all non-neighboring states as controls in regressions in the lower 
panel. The estimated results are similar in the two panels. Using non-neighboring states 
as controls, we find that monthly per capita spending on advertisement fall by 2.4 cents in 
Washington during the summer TV hiatus; lottery sales drop by about 1.4 percent. The 
estimated semi-elasticity is 5.9, which implies that a one-cent reduction in monthly 
advertising spending per capita results in 5.9 percent decrease in sales. Given that the 
treatment only lasts for six months, the estimated semi-elasticity is statistically significant 
with 90 percent confidence; though estimated effects in the “first-stage” and “reduced-
form” regressions are significant with 95 percent confidence.  
Based on estimates from the lower panel of Table 3-11, we calculate the elasticity 
of sales with respect to advertising and the gross rate of return to advertising in Table 3-
12. The elasticity calculated is 0.07, which suggests that a ten percent decrease in 
advertising expenditure leads to 0.7 percent decrease in sales. The gross rate of return is 
31.49, which suggests that a one-cent decrease in monthly advertising expenditure per 
capita produces about 31 cents decrease in monthly lottery sales per capita. 
In Table 3-13, we report the set of estimates from equation (3-1) – (3-3) using as 
controls observation from states with a similar game mix as Washington. In the upper 
panel, three states (New Jersey, New York, and Ohio) that joined the Big Game 
Consortium around the same time as Washington are in the control group. In the lower 
panel, four states (California, Kansas, Michigan, and Oregon) that offered keno games 
before or during the same year as Washington are in the control group. In the lower 




expenditures, and negative but statistically insignificant impacts of summer hiatus on 
sales. The point estimates of the semi-elasticity are not very different from what we 
obtain in Table 3-11, but only statistically significant at a p-value of 0.20. In the upper 
panel, none of the “first-stage” or “reduced-form” estimates is significant at a p-value of 
0.10, and the 2SLS estimate of semi-elasticity is only significant at a p-value of 0.30. 
To estimate the retention rate of advertising in equation (3-4), we need twelve-
month lags of advertising. However, the first summer TV hiatus occurred in July 1993 
and our sample starts from January 1992. We therefore do not have enough data points to 
estimate the retention rate of advertising in this experiment. 
 
3.6.3 Estimated Impacts of Advertising Caps in Massachusetts 
The advertising budget of the Massachusetts State Lottery was cut drastically in 
1994 and has been kept at a low level ever since. In Figure 3-5, we plot the monthly 
advertising expenditure per capita by the Massachusetts State Lottery. The solid 
horizontal lines represent average monthly advertising spending before and after the 
budget cuts separately. Before the budget cut in 1994, the state lottery spent 6 cents per 
capita per month on advertising. The figure dropped by 95 percent to 0.3 cents per month 
after the cut; spending on both TV and non-TV media were slashed as a result of the 
advertising restrictions.  
Anecdotal evidence suggests that the Massachusetts State Lottery allocated the 
reduced budget unevenly over different games. Eric Fehrnstrom, the State Treasurer’s 
spokesman, said that instant games received the bulk of the lottery’s advertising effort, 




advertising efforts.45 We plot the monthly sales per capita of instant and online games in 
Figure 3-6. Monthly sales of online games decreased by 31 percent from $12 to $8 after 
the budget cutbacks, while sales of instant games increased by about 50 percent from $19 
to $28. In Figure 3-7, we plot total monthly sales per capita over the sample period. 
Rather than a drop in sales, total monthly sales per capita increased from $31 to $43 after 
1994.  
We compare the monthly averages of advertising spending (total and by media), 
total sales, sales of traditional online games, and sales of instant games before and after 
the advertising caps in Table 3-14. Although monthly averages of total and media-
specific advertising expenditures are significantly reduced after the treatment, we can 
only detect a significant fall in the average sales of traditional online games. Monthly 
average of total sales and sales of instant games are significantly higher after 1994 than 
before. 
When we apply the interrupted time series analysis to the sales and advertising 
series of Massachusetts Lottery in Table 3-15, we find a statistically significant negative 
trend in advertising spending after 1994, a negative and statistically insignificant trend in 
sales of traditional online game after 1994, and positive and statistically insignificant 
trends on both total sales and sales of instant games after 1994.  
A couple of reasons led to the rising trend in total sales and sales of instant games. 
During the 1990s, state lotteries began offering instant game tickets in face value of 
multiple dollars (for example, $2, $3, $5, $7 and $10). The new multi-dollar instant 
games offer higher payout ratios than the original $1 ticket. Among all state lotteries, 
Massachusetts lottery’s instant games offer the highest prize payout in the country, 
                                                 




ranging from 69 to 80 percent. For instance, the ten-dollar instant game “Spectacular” in 
Massachusetts offers an 80 percent return to players. Innovation of such high payout 
games bolstered sales of instant games, which could overshadow the negative impact of 
reduced advertisement. Simple mean comparison of sales before and after the treatment 
and trend comparison using interrupted time series analysis cannot isolate the treatment 
effect we are interested in. Later in this section, we include a set of game dummy 
variables in regression models to separate the effects of game innovations on sales from 
the treatment effect. 
Another reason behind the rising sales is the introduction of keno games. As 
shown in the lower part of Figure 3-7, keno started in Massachusetts in 1994. The 
concurrence of the keno introduction and advertising caps contaminates the evaluation of 
this quasi-experiment. Unlike the Illinois and Washington experiments, the 
Massachusetts case has an additional “treatment” – the introduction of keno – that 
potentially contaminates the evaluation of the experiment. To separate the impacts of the 
two shocks, we include in the regression a set of dummy variables representing the 
introduction of keno games. Luckily, we have eleven other state lotteries that also offer 
keno games. Among those, eight introduced keno at some point during the sample 
period.46 Assuming the effects of keno games on lottery sales are similar across these 
states, we can pick up the common impact of keno games on sales through the set of keno 
dummy variables, and capture the impact of advertising caps on sales by the treatment 
dummy variable. 
                                                 





To understand the impact of keno on total sales and sales of other games, we run a 
separate regression for each state that started offering keno games during the sample 
period. The dependent variables are the natural logs of monthly total sales per capita, 
monthly sales of traditional online games per capita, and monthly sales of instant games 
per capita. Covariates on the right hand side are the state personal income, state 
unemployment rate and the dummy variable that equals one in the months when the keno 
game was introduced. We report the coefficients on the dummy variable in Table 3-16. In 
models where the outcome is total sales, we find a statistically significant and positive 
coefficient on the keno dummy variable in five of seven cases. The coefficient on the 
keno dummy is statistically significant and positive in three of seven cases when the 
dependent variable is sales of instant sales, and statistically significant and positive in two 
of seven cases when the dependent variable is sales of traditional online games. Pooling 
the seven states together, we apply the fixed effects estimation and find that the 
introduction of keno has positive impacts on sales of the three different game 
combinations. The estimated positive impacts are statistically significant on total sales 
and instant sales. We hope that including the set of keno dummy variables can help us 
single out the treatment effect. 
Using as controls states with similar pre-treatment trends in advertising spending 
and sales,47 we estimate equations (3-1) – (3-3) with the log of monthly sales of 
traditional online games as the dependent variable and report the OLS and robust 
estimates of key coefficients in the upper panel of Table 3-17. We find that monthly 
advertising spending per capita fall by 6.6 cents after 1994; monthly sales of traditional 
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online games fall by 28.3 percent after 1994. The estimated semi-elasticity is 4.275. All 
estimates are statistically significant with 95 percent confidence.  
We calculate the elasticity of sales with respect to advertising and gross rate of 
return to advertising in Table 3-18. The calculated elasticity is 0.011, which implies that a 
ten percent decrease in advertising spending results in 0.11 percent decrease in sales of 
traditional online games. The gross rate of return is 35.92, which implies that a one-cent 
decrease in advertising spending results in 35.92 cents decrease in sales of traditional 
online games. We should be careful in the interpretation of the estimated semi-elasticity 
in Table 3-17. It is not comparable to the ones obtained from the quasi-experiments in 
Illinois and Washington in Table 3-4 and 3-11. Because we do not have information on 
how much budget is allocated to advertisement for traditional online games, our “first-
stage” estimate measures the average reduction in total advertising spending after 1994. 
Given the press information on the uneven distribution of the budget over different 
games, our “first-stage” estimates could under- or over- estimate the reduction of 
advertising on traditional online games 
In the lower panel of Table 3-17, we use non-neighboring states with similar pre-
treatment trends in sales and advertising expenditure as the Massachusetts Lottery as 
control states. The point estimates are essentially the same as their counterparts in the 
upper panel, and all are statistically significant with 95 percent confidence. In Table 3-20, 
we report the set of estimates from equation (3-1) – (3-3) using as controls observation 
from states with similar game mix as Massachusetts. In the upper panel, four states that 
joined the Big Game Consortium at the same time as Massachusetts are in the control 




negative and statistically significant at a p-value of 0.05. The 2SLS estimate of semi-
elasticity is also significant with 95 percent confidence, although the size of the estimate 
and the standard error are larger than the estimates in Table 3-17. In the lower panel, 
seven states that offered keno games before or during the same year as Massachusetts are 
in the control group. We are able to identify significantly negative “first-stage” impacts 
on monthly advertising expenditures, and negative but statistically insignificant impacts 
on sales. The estimated semi-elasticity is not statistically significant. 
In Table 3-21, we report estimates using all lottery states except Illinois and 
Washington as controls in the upper panel, and estimates using all non-neighboring states 
except Illinois and Washington as controls in the lower panel. All the estimates are 
statistically significant at a p-value of 0.05. The point estimates of the semi-elasticity are 
close to the estimates in Table 3-17.  
To determine the persistent effect of advertisement on sales, we estimate a series 
of equation (3-4) allowing different numbers of past advertising expenditures entering the 
regression. The estimated retention rates (δ) are reported in Table 3-22. In the upper 
panel, we include advertising expenditures of the past nine months or above in the 
regression. The estimated retention rate bounces between -1.832 and 1.460; the estimated 
short-term advertising effects are not statistically different from zero with large p-values. 
We then estimate equation (3-4) including advertising expenditures of the past five, six, 
seven and eight months in the regression. The corresponding estimates are recorded in the 
lower panel of Table 3-21. The estimated retention rates in the lower panel are fairly 




When we include advertising spending of the past six months in the regression of 
equation (3-4), the estimated rate of retention is 0.679 at a p-value of 0.024. The result 
suggests that 67.9 percent of the effect of current advertising is carried over into the next 
month. After six months, only 10 percent of the effect is left. In other words, 90 percent 
of the advertising effect depreciates after six months. The estimated short-term semi-
elasticity is 3.108 at a p-value of 0.076, which suggests that a one-cent decrease in 
advertising spending leads to 3.1 percent decrease in current sales. If we sum up the 
cumulative effects of advertising over six months, a one-cent decrease in current 
advertising spending could cause sales fall by 8.73 percent in the long term.48  
We also apply the whole set of estimation procedures to sales of instant games 
and total sales. With sales of instant games as the dependent variable, we are able to 
identify negative impacts on sales in the “reduced-form” regressions, but the estimates 
are not statistically significant in most of the regressions. Subsequently, the estimates of 
the semi-elasticity are not statistically significant either. With total sales as the 
independent variables, the estimated impacts on sales of advertising caps are positive and 




Using a difference-in-difference model, we find that reductions in advertising 
spending in the three quasi-experimental states reduce lottery sales. After correcting for 
                                                 





serial correlation in residual terms within states, we calculate the elasticity of sales with 
respect to advertising in the range of 0.07 to 0.16. Though of different products, our 
estimated elasticity is in line with previous studies: Seldon et al (1989) find that the 
elasticity of cigarette sales with respect to advertising ranges between 0.1-0.25; and 
Valdés (1993) reports an estimated elasticity of 0.08-0.09 in the cigarettes industry in 
Spain.  
Although most state lotteries have been on the market for more than thirty years, 
our estimated results show that advertisement can still affect sales significantly. Contrary 
to the belief of some state legislatures that state lotteries spend too much on advertising, 
our results suggest that they maybe advertising too little in terms of maximizing net 
revenue. We find that a one-cent decrease in monthly advertising spending per capita 
results in a decrease in gross sales of 31-38 cents. Assuming that thirty percent of sales 
are retained in state coffers as profit, a one dollar decrease in advertising spending could 
cost state government $9-10 of net revenue at the margin.  
The results are not surprising if we recall that advertising expenditure accounts for 
only 1.17 percent of total sales, while casinos on Las Vegas Boulevard spend 2.4 to 4 
percent of the total hotel-casinos’ sales on advertising, restaurant owners spent 3.2 
percent of their sales on advertising, beverage manufacturers 7.5 percent, cosmetics 
companies 8.8 percent, and candy makers 12.7 percent. Advertising of state lotteries is 
well below what other industries are spending. State lotteries are limited in their ability to 
maximize profits due to state regulations such specification of payout ratios in the state 
codes, explicitly caps on the advertising budget at no more than a small percentage of 




unreasonable that we find that state lotteries fall far down the advertising response curve 
away from the saturation stage. 
 It is also interesting that we find lottery advertisement is short-lived in our three 
quasi-experiments. Most of the effects of advertising depreciate within half a year. Our 
explanation is that informative advertisement providing game-specific information tends 
to be short-lived compared to persuasive advertisement designed to cultivate players’ 
preferences, and that informative advertisement has a better chance to survive budget cuts 
than persuasive ones. Therefore, our estimated retention rate of lottery advertisement 
during the period of budgetary stringency could reflect the dominating effect of 
informative advertisement. However, we do not have enough data to support the 
argument. Obtaining micro-level data to estimate the differential effects of informative 








Over the past four decades there has been a rapid growth in both the number and 
size of state lotteries in the United States. In 1964, New Hampshire became the first state 
since the late 1800s to run a lottery. Since then, thirty-seven other states and the District 
of Columbia have instituted lotteries. The gross sale of lottery tickets now exceeds $37 
billion per year, adding about $12 billion per year to state budgets. 
Some states deposit lottery profits back into their general funds, but most states 
have earmarked lottery profits to fund particular projects such as parks and recreation, 
environmental improvements and programs for senior citizens. The most popular 
destination for earmarked lottery funds is, however, public schools with eighteen of 
twenty-five states that earmark funds using profits for K-12 education. Given the 
fungibility of money, many economists and political observers have questioned the 
effectiveness of earmarking policies. The fungibility of money is, however, rejected in a 
variety of empirical applications in public finance, most notably, the large literature on 
the “flypaper effect.” Intergovernmental grants are equivalent to increases in income, so 
economic theory predicts these grants should not increase spending by an amount more 
than an equal increase in income. However, dozens of studies have demonstrated that 
money “sticks where it hits.” Hines et al. (1995) review a number of empirical tests of the 




cents for every dollar increase in income, unrestricted block grants increase spending 
dollar for dollar. Whether earmarking can increase spending on a particular category is 
therefore an empirical question. 
State lotteries provide an excellent opportunity to examine the impact of 
earmarking. First, there are variations in earmarking policies both across states and within 
states over time that can be exploited in an econometric model. Among the thirty-seven 
state lotteries in our sample period of 1978-1998, nine states have always earmarked 
lottery profits for public education; five have changed the allocation between the general 
fund and educational earmarking; and eight states have earmarked lottery profits for 
programs other than education. The rest of the fifteen states have always deposited lottery 
profits into the state general fund. These fifteen states can be used as a comparison group 
in a difference-in-difference type estimator. Second, lottery profits are driven up or down 
by the introduction of new games and/or the legalization of other forms of gambling 
within the state. Variation in lottery profits within states can be employed to identify their 
impact on public educational spending. Third, lottery profits are a small portion of state 
budgets, thus providing a “fair” test of the fungibility of money. 
Using a panel of state expenditures on public education in states with lotteries, we 
examine the impact of earmarking lottery profits for K-12 education on spending in this 
category. We perform three different sets of tests. First, we restrict our attention to the 
nine states that have always earmarked lottery profits for K-12 education, and examine 
whether year-to-year changes in state spending on education are correlated with changes 
in lottery profits over the same period. If earmarking increases spending dollar for dollar, 




the dependent variable should equal 1. Second, we examine states that switched the 
allocation of lottery profits between the general fund and public education during the 
sample period. If earmarking increases spending on education dollar for dollar, we should 
see an increase in K-12 spending commensurate with the amount of new monies 
allocated to the earmarked category once the profits were shifted to this category. In both 
of these tests, we use as a comparison group the fifteen states that have always deposited 
their lottery profits into the general fund. We also examine the changes in K-12 spending 
in states that have always earmarked lottery profits for non-educational programs. To 
control for heterogeneity across states and over time in per capita state spending on 
education, we include state and year effects, plus state-specific time trends in our 
statistical model.  
The first test, using earmarking states, is limited because the model is identified 
by unexplained period-to-period changes in lottery profits. We simply examine whether 
K-12 spending increased when lottery profits rose. The second test, using states switching 
between earmarking and non-earmarking, is subject to the criticism that the group of 
states moving their allocation of lottery profits from the general fund to educational fund 
is a selected sample. For example, these states may have expected greater than average 
growth in educational spending, leading them to earmark lottery profits. As we outline 
below, however, our reading of the legislative history does not indicate this was the case. 
To deal directly with these limitations, we offer a third empirical model where we 
examine particular events that should alter the lottery profits generated by states. For 
example, in “first-stage” regressions, we show that the introduction of lotto games and 




casino-style gaming in a state reduces lottery profits. In reduced-form models, we can 
also examine how K-12 spending is correlated with these events. Drawing on these two 
results, we can use the shocks to lottery sales as instruments for profits in a two-stage 
least squares model.  
In all three empirical tests, we find very similar results. First, we find that 
earmarked money is partially fungible. A dollar increase in the earmarked profits 
contributes an additional 60 to 80 cents to school expenditures. Although some money is 
leaked away from the intended purpose, we do find that earmarking increases educational 
spending by an amount larger than the value produced by having an extra dollar in lottery 
profits added to the general fund. In particular, each dollar of lottery profits increases 
school spending by about 40 to 50 cents in states that deposit profits into the general fund 
and by only 30 cents in states that earmark profits for areas other than education. Using a 
Bayesian estimation procedure for inequality restrictions in the normal linear least 
squares model, we find there is a high likelihood that a dollar of earmarked lottery profits 
generates less than a dollar of spending on K-12 education, but more than the spending 
generated from a dollar of lottery profits allocated to the general fund. Our results are 
fairly stable across different sample periods, control groups, and different estimators. For 
example, the results are very similar whether we use a fixed-effects specification or 
“long-differences” that exploit 5-year lags. 
 
4.2 Earmarking of Lottery Profits 
Lottery profits are a controversial source of state revenue. In order to reduce 




profits would be used for a “good cause”. Of the thirty-seven states with lotteries in the 
year 1998, twenty-two states earmark at least a portion of lottery profits for specific 
programs: eight of them earmark lottery profits for programs such as parks and 
recreation, senior citizens, property tax relief, and college scholarships; fourteen earmark 
lottery profits for K-12 education. The remaining fifteen states deposit lottery profits into 
the general revenue fund. In Table 2-1, we summarize the allocation of lottery proceeds 
in thirty-seven states and Washington D.C. since the inception of the lottery in each state. 
In some cases, it is not clear into which category each state falls. Although some 
states earmark funds for particular purposes, the legislation does not specify what fraction 
should be devoted to particular categories. In these instances, we define the usage of 
lottery profits as general revenue. For example, Arizona earmarks lottery profits for five 
projects and the general fund, Indiana earmarks lottery funds for five projects, Kentucky 
earmarks lottery money for a scholarship program and the general fund, Rhode Island 
earmarks for distressed city and towns plus the general fund, South Dakota earmarks for 
two other projects and the general fund, and West Virginia has earmarked for three 
different projects since 1989. None of these states indicates what fraction of funds should 
be devoted to each category. Therefore we classify these states as placing lottery profits 
into the general revenue fund.  
It is worth noting that some of the states have altered the use of lottery money 
over time. For example, Missouri shifted lottery profits from its general revenue fund to 
an educational fund in 1992, and Illinois did not earmark lottery profits for K-12 schools 




allocation of lottery profits between the general revenue and educational funds. Nine 
states have always earmarked lottery money for public education. 
 
4.3 Previous Evidence on the Fungibility of Earmarked Money 
Some theoretical models suggest that earmarking revenues for a particular 
category should not increase the targeted spending by an amount more than it would be 
increased if the money were not earmarked. A prototypical model can be found in Wilde 
(1968). However, empirical evidence on the fungibility of earmarked money is not 
consistent with the theoretical predictions. Hines et al. (1995) survey a number of 
empirical papers on intergovernmental grants and conclude that, while local spending 
increases by about five to ten cents for every dollar increase in income, unrestricted block 
grants increase spending dollar for dollar. Because money “sticks where it hits,” this 
phenomenon has been called the flypaper effect. Researchers studying domestic fiscal 
response to categorical foreign aid find mixed empirical results. Some find that the 
earmarked aid increases total public expenditures (Pack et al. 1990, Cashell-Cordo et al. 
1990 and Feyzioglu et al. 1998), some find that aid is highly fungible (Franco-Rodriguez 
2000), while others find foreign aid has no significant impact on domestic revenues or 
expenditures (Swaroop et al. 2000 and Gupta 1993). 
A few authors have examined the fungibility of lottery profits earmarked for 
education in the United States. Studies by Mikesell et al. (1986), Borg et al. (1990), 
Summers et al. (1995) and Vance et al (1999) examine educational expenditures in states 
that earmark lottery profits for public education. They fit time-series data with linear or 




None of them finds positive effects on school spending. Some findings suggest that 
earmarking reduces state spending on schools. Spindler (1995) improves the 
identification strategy by modeling state educational spending as an AR (1) process and 
allowing state spending to shift according to a step function after lotteries are introduced. 
Using data from seven states, Spindler concludes that lottery profits on average are 
fungible over the period of 1961-1992.49 Garrett (2001) estimates a similar model using 
data from Ohio State. He adds additional covariates into the regression model, such as 
lottery profits per capita and per capita income. Garrett finds suggestive evidence that up 
to half of the money earmarked for education finds it way to school spending, but the 
results are not statistically significant. 
Instead of focusing on one state at a time, we examine a panel data set of all states 
with lotteries. Within state variation in lottery profits is used to identify its impact on 
public educational expenditures. To determine the effectiveness of the earmarking policy, 
we compare the impact of lottery profits on school spending in earmarking and non-
earmarking states. Our work is most similar to that of Novarro (2002), who 
independently estimates models similar to those in this paper. Novarro finds that a dollar 
of lottery profit earmarked for education increases current educational spending by 
roughly 36 cents more than a non-earmarking dollar and 60 cents more than a dollar 
earmarked for non-educational expenditures. The dependent variable in Novarro’s work 
is state-level per student current expenditures, which includes spending on instruction, 
operation and maintenance, and other day-to-day costs. Current expenditures are “spent” 
by local school districts and monies for operation are from local, state and federal 
                                                 




sources. Her test, therefore, is a joint test that lottery profits and grants to local districts 
are fungible. 
 
4.4 A Within-Group Econometric Model 
 
4.4.1 Fixed Effects Estimation 
In general, our regression model is based on traditional analysis as in Wilde 
(1968). State spending on public education is a function of net lottery revenue and 
exogenous state characteristics, which can be derived from the utility maximization of the 
state government. The data set we use for this analysis contains annual observations at 
state-level per capita K-12 spending and lottery profits. Lottery profits vary from year to 
year for a variety of reasons. In states where lotteries were introduced at some time 
during the panel, the obvious cause of the change in profits is simply the introduction of 
the lottery. In all lottery states, profits change from one year to another through the 
introduction of new games or the changing affinity the state’s population may have for 
gambling. Thus, the impact we are identifying is the marginal propensity of the state 
government to spend on K-12 schools out of an extra dollar available from lottery profits. 
If earmarking changes spending patterns, we would expect educational spending to grow 
dollar for dollar with lottery profits. 
The counterfactual we need to identify is what states would have done with the 
extra money had lottery profits not been earmarked for education. In order to do so, we 
include in all models data from states that place lottery profits directly into the general 




earmark lottery profits for expenditures on government services other than K-12 schools. 
For this final group, if earmarked money sticks where it hits, we would expect little 
change in K-12 spending. Given that we have data from various types of states (those that 
earmark and those that do not), the most natural model to estimate is a within-group 
estimator where we hold constant permanent differences in state educational spending 
and test whether increases in lottery profits generate a differential increase in K-12 
spending in earmarking versus non-earmarking states.  
Consider a pool of states, all with lotteries. Some earmark lotteries for education 
(E it =1), some earmark lotteries for other expenditures (O it =1), and the rest deposit 
lottery profits into the general fund (G it =1). Let Lit represent state lottery profits per 
capita in state i year t, while K12it represent state per capita expenditures on K-12 
education in state i year t. The simple within-group model outlined above can be 
expressed by the following equation: 
 
K12it = α1*Lit*Eit + α2 *Lit*Git + α3*Lit*Oit + β*X it + ui + vt + λiTt + εit (4-1) 
 
where Xit is a vector of socioeconomic, demographic and legal characteristics that 
describe the state’s willingness and ability to devote resources to K-12 education, ui and 
vt are state and year fixed effects. Tt is a simple linear time trend, and therefore λi is a 
state-specific time trend coefficient. The final term is an idiosyncratic error.  
In many studies where school spending is the outcome of interest, K-12 spending 
is denominated by the number of students. However, in this case, we must use the same 




variables in our analysis are per capita K-12 spending and per capita lottery profits. The 
key parameters of interest are α1, α2, and α3, which represent the additional lottery dollar 
spent on K-12 education in states that earmark lottery profits for K-12 schools, place 
profits in the general fund, and earmark profits for other government services, 
respectively. 
The state fixed-effects are required for a number of reasons. First, state per capita 
educational expenditures vary considerably across states. New Hampshire spends on 
average less than a hundred dollars per capita on K-12 schools, while California spends 
about $500 per capita. Many of the between-state differences in levels of school spending 
are results of historical and political factors that cannot be fully captured by measurable 
covariates. Therefore, we control for these permanent differences by including a 
complete set of state fixed-effects in the regression model. Second, one might be 
concerned that the level of K-12 spending and lottery profits might be correlated. For 
example, suppose that larger, more urban states have higher than average spending on 
education. Suppose also that these states can more effectively exploit their size by 
offering a larger selection of lottery games and, hence, generate more lottery profits. In a 
simple cross-section of data, this type of correlation would bias upwards the coefficient 
on the α’s. Controlling for state fixed-effects allows for the possibility that states with 
higher than average educational spending have a different level of lottery profits. The 
year effects control for shocks to spending that are common to states but vary across 
years, such as national recessions.  
There are not only permanent differences across states in the level of K-12 




public schools. To demonstrate this point, we run, for each state, a simple time-series 
regression where the dependent variable is state per capita K-12 spending and the three 
covariates are the fraction of the state population that is enrolled in public schools, per 
capita income, and a simple time trend. For these regressions, we used data from 1978 
through 1998. The time trend is negative in 20 states, and positive for 30 states. The 
range of the time coefficients is about $63 per capita. Michigan ranks at the top in terms 
of the annual growth of state school expenditure per capita, about $50 per capita growth 
annually; North Carolina ranks the lowest with about $13 per capita decrease each year. 
Given the wide range of growth of per capita K-12 spending, we also include in our 
analysis state-specific time trends. These time trends could also help control for a 
possible non-random selection of states into the earmarked category. One might be 
concerned that states with expected above average growth in educational spending would 
be more likely to earmark profits for education. By including the state-specific time 
trends, we control to some degree for this possible problem. 
We include a variety of socioeconomic characteristics that have been found to be 
correlated with state spending on education in previous studies, such as state personal 
income, the share of the population unemployed, the share of the population enrolled in 
public schools, the racial composition and age structure of the state population, and the 
education attainments of the adult population. We also include in Xit two sets of variables 
that measure legislative and legal reforms that may have altered state support for K-12 
education. Starting in the 1970s, the constitutionality of education finance formulas was 
challenged in forty-three states. By 1997, education finance systems were declared 




impacts of these decisions was to increase state support for public education. In this case, 
we capture the impact of finance reform by including a set of dummy variables that equal 
1 in the first, second, third, fourth, fifth and sixth or more full year after the court 
decision. Most of the court cases were initiated because of large disparities across 
districts in per pupil spending. Much of these disparities are produced because local 
school districts rely heavily on the property tax for local financing of schools and the 
value of this tax base varies considerably across districts. A growing dissatisfaction with 
the property tax has led some states to directly reform local finance of schools by de-
emphasizing the property tax. For example, legislation in Michigan, Oregon, and 
Vermont50 has greatly reduced local districts’ dependence on the property tax and shifted 
much of the school finance to the state level. In these states, we also construct a series of 
dummy variables that parallel in structure the values for court-mandated finance. 
In order to compare the impact of earmarked lottery profits with the impact of 
money from general revenue fund, we group the panel of lottery states into two sub-
samples. First, thirty-seven states with lotteries are divided into four groups. The “K-12” 
group includes the nine states that have always earmarked lottery profits for K-12 
education.51 The “Changers” group includes the five states that changed the allocation of 
lottery profits between the general revenue and educational funds during the sample 
period.52 The “Earmark Non-Education” group includes the eight states that earmark 
                                                 
50 In Oregon the passage of Measure 5 in 1990, a property tax limitation measure, requires the state 
legislature to offset lost property tax revenue with money from state general fund. In Michigan, Proposal A 
in 1994 has reduce total school property taxes by about 33 percent and increased the state share of total 
revenue for K-12 education. In Vermont, Act 60 in 1997 set a statewide property tax rate of $1.10 for all 
towns and the share of state block grants has increased from 40 percent to 60 percent. 
51 The nine states are California, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Michigan, New Hampshire, New Mexico, New 
York and Ohio.  




lottery profits for government services other than education.53 The “General Revenue” 
group includes the fifteen lottery states that have always deposited lottery profits into the 
general revenue fund.54 Referring to the econometric model above, if state i belongs to 
the “K-12” group in year t, then Eit equals 1, Oit and Git equal 0. If state i belongs to the 
“Earmark Non-Education” group in year t, then Oit equals 1, Eit and Git equal 0. If state i 
belongs to the “General Revenue” group in year t, then Git equals 1, Eit and Oit equal 0. If 
state i is in the “Changers” group, then Eit equals 1 when the state earmarks lottery profits 
for education, and equals 0 when the state deposits lottery profits into the general fund; 
Git equals 1 minus Eit; and Oit equals 0. The four groups are then combined into two sub-
samples: sub-sample 1 includes the “K-12,” the “Earmark Non-Education,” and the 
“General Revenue” groups; sub-sample 2 includes the “Changers” and the “General 
Revenue” groups. 
We examine the two data sets separately for two reasons. First, the type of 
variation in lottery profits Lit that is used to identify the model is very different in the two 
sub-samples. In models using sub-sample 1, we are measuring whether unexplained 
movements in Lit are more correlated with K12it in states that earmark profits for 
education versus states that do not. In contrast, in the “Changers” sub-sample, we 
measure whether the unexplained within panel covariance in Lit and K12it is different 
before and after the money is earmarked for education. Second, there is sufficient 
concern that the group of states that shift their allocation of lottery profits from the 
                                                 
53 The eight states are Colorado, Kansas, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nebraska, New Jersey, Pennsylvania 
and Wisconsin. 
54 The fifteen states are Arizona, Connecticut, Delaware, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, 




general fund to the earmarked category is not a random sample. We do not want to 
potentially contaminate the “K-12” group with these observations.  
 
4.4.2 Robust Estimation of Standard Error in Fixed Effects Model 
Bertrand et al (2002) points out that in a fixed-effects model such as equation (4-
1), standard errors estimated using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) method can be biased 
because of possible serial correlation in error terms. If the error term follows an AR (1) 
process with positive serial correlation, the estimated standard error using OLS method 
will be biased downwards. Consequently, the under-estimated standard error could 
contribute to a higher false negative t-test statistics.  
To obtain robust estimates of the standard error, we follow the same procedure 
employed in Chapter 3, the econometric method suggested by Anderson & Hsiao (1982) 
to correct for autocorrelation in error terms. Given that the dependent variable is annual 
school spending per capita, we assume the error term follows an AR (1) process. 
Computationally, we first estimate the first-order autocorrelation coefficient of the 
residuals from the estimation of equation (4-1) by running a regression of the residual on 
its lags. We allow each state to have its own autocorrelation parameter. Then we use 
these estimated coefficients to obtain robust estimates of standard errors as we have done 
in the previous chapter.  
 
4.4.3 First-, 3-year, and 5-year Differences Estimations 
Within-group variation in lottery profits is used to identify the impact of lottery 




sensitive to model specification if the regression is subject to contamination from 
measurement error, omitted time-varying characteristics, or omitted lagged effects. To 
deal with these issues, McKinnish (2000) suggests obtaining estimates using fixed effect, 
first difference, and long difference models. If the regression is correctly specified, the 
models should produce similar coefficient estimates. Therefore we also estimate first-
difference, 3-year difference, and 5-year difference models of the form: 
 
∆jK12it = α1*∆j (Lit*Eit) + α2*∆j (Lit*Git) + α3*∆j (Lit*Oit) + β*∆jX it + vt + λi + µit     (4-2) 
 
where j=1, 3, or 5. vt absorbs variation in common shocks to all states in a given year, and 
λi captures the state specific time trend. State fixed effects are canceled out in the 
difference calculation.  
 
4.4.4 Bayesian Inference of Hypothesis Tests 
Based on estimates of α1, α2, and α3, we can test a number of hypotheses about 
the fungibility of lottery profits. Specifically, we can test whether earmarked money 
increases spending dollar for dollar, the hypothesis is α1 = 1. We can also test whether 
earmarking has no impact on school spending by examining the null hypothesis α1 = α2 = 
α3. In addition, we can examine alternative hypotheses that involve more detailed tests of 
the parameters. For example, the probability that earmarking does not increase spending 
dollar for dollar is simply the probability that α1 < 1. Likewise, if earmarking has some 




most in a “K-12” state and least in an “Earmark Non-Education” state, which suggests 
that α1 > α2 > α3. 
Usually, t and F statistics are calculated to test equality constraints in linear 
regression models. However, such tests do not extend readily to inequality constrained 
linear models in a classical statistical framework. Geweke (1986) demonstrates that tests 
of inequality restrictions in the normal linear least squares model are easily incorporated 
into a Bayesian framework. Consider a simple linear regression model for n observations 
and k exogenous variables of the form Y = Xβ + ε, where ε is assumed to be normally 
distributed with a mean 0 and a variance/covariance matrix σ2In. Geweke assumes a 
diffuse prior on σ, and a simple indicator function q (β) as a prior on β that equals 1 when 
the inequality restriction is binding and zero otherwise. Because the prior on β is 
improper, there is no closed-form representation for the posterior. However, numeric 
estimates of the moments of the posterior can easily be obtained via Monte Carlo 
integration. Specifically, after integrating out σ, Geweke demonstrates that the posterior 
distribution for β is proportional to the product of a multivariate t-distribution and the 
indicator function q(β). Random draws of the parameter vector β are then made to a 
multivariate t distribution with parameters β~ = (X′X)-1(X′Y) and variance s2 = (Y-X 
β~ )′(Y-X β~ )/(n-k). The moments from the set of random draws that satisfy the 
inequality restrictions are the exact moments of the constrained estimator. The fraction of 
draws that satisfy the inequality restriction is an estimate of the probability that the 
inequality restriction is true. The number of random draws determines the numerical 
accuracy of a simulated moment. Geweke shows that in this case, if there are m random 




deviation of the simulated moment. So with only 10,000 draws, the measurement error 
generated by simulating the mean of the distribution is only 1 percent of the value of the 
standard deviation of all random draws. In our work, we make 400,000 draws using 
antithetic acceleration as described in Geweke’s paper. 
 
4.4.5 Data  
Data on state expenditures on K-12 education in this analysis are obtained from 
the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES). The key outcome in our analysis 
should be some measure of the allocation of funds to education at the state level. Such 
data are available in terms of both expenditures and revenues. In general, state 
expenditures on public education include not only revenues of own source but also from 
federal transfer and/or grants and local sources of school spending. In contrast, state 
revenue data record only own source revenues allocated to educational spending. Since 
we are interested in the fungibility of lottery profits at the state level, the revenue data are 
used. In those states where lottery profits are allocated to public education, some grant all 
the proceeds to elementary and secondary school systems (K-12), and others divide the 
money between K-12 and post-secondary education. Since K-12 education is always 
among the beneficiaries, state revenues allocated to K-12 schools are examined as the 
dependent variable.  
The variable of interest in the regression is the net lottery revenue allocated to K-
12 schools. Raw data on net lottery revenue were obtained from La Fleur’s,55 a private 
company that provides lottery statistics. Of the states earmarking lottery money for 
education, some spend all the lottery profits on K-12 schools, such as New Hampshire 
                                                 




and Michigan, while states such as Idaho divide the money between K-12 and post-
secondary education. We collect detailed information on the division of lottery profits 
between K-12 schools and post-secondary education in each state and construct the 
independent variable Eit as the net lottery revenue allocated to K-12 schools. 
State demographic variables are obtained from the following sources: school 
enrollment from the NCES; state personal income from the Bureau of Economic 
Analysis; state unemployment rates from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS); state 
population, age/race composition, and state adult educational attainments from the United 
States Bureau of Census. 
All the money values are real 1996 dollars, calculated using the CPI-urban index 
from the BLS. All the variables are in per capita terms. The sample contains 756 
observations of 36 states in the United States over the period of 1978 to 1998.56 Table 4-1 
provides summary statistics of the four state groups: the “K-12,” the “General Revenue,” 
the “Earmark Non-Education,” and the “Changers” groups. 
 
4.5 Regression Results 
 
4.5.1 Estimates and Test Statistics 
In Table 4-2, we report estimates of equations (4-1) and (4-2) using sub-sample 1 
where the “K-12,” the “General Revenue,” and the “Earmark Non-Education” groups are 
pooled together. In the top panel of the table, we report point estimates of the impacts of 
lottery profits on state K-12 spending for each group using fixed effect, first difference, 
                                                 




3-year difference, and 5-year difference estimator separately. In the bottom panel of the 
table, we report statistical tests associated with the parameters α1, α2, and α3. For brevity, 
we report the coefficients on the other covariates in Xit in the appendices.57 
In the fixed effect model, an additional dollar of lottery profits increases spending 
by 60 cents in “K-12” states, an amount 10 cents larger than the increase in spending in 
general revenue states and 30 cents larger than the increase in states that earmark lottery 
profits for non-educational purposes. Given the large standard errors on α3, we cannot 
reject the null hypothesis that these three coefficients are the same. The probability that 
earmarking increases spending at less than a dollar for dollar rate is 0.92, the probability 
that a higher amount per dollar of lottery profits is spent on schools in “K-12” states than 
in “General Revenue” states is 0.62, the probability that more is spent on schools in 
“General Revenue” states than in “Earmark Non-Education” states is 0.74. However, the 
probability of α1 > α2 > α3 is only 0.5 because of the large standard errors on α3. 
The within-group estimator produces similar results to short-term and long-term 
difference estimators, although standard errors increase as the sample size shrinks in the 
long difference models. Fixed effect and 5-year difference estimates on α1 and α2 are 
statistically significant and positive and of the same scale. First difference and 3-year 
                                                 
57 Our estimated coefficients are similar to results obtained in other research. A one-dollar increase in state 
personal income per capita increases K-12 school spending by about 1.4 cents. The share of the population 
aged 65+ has a statistically significant and negative effect on public educational expenditures as in Poterba 
(1997 and 1998) and Harris et al. (2001). A one percent increase in the elderly population reduces state 
budgets for schools by about $28 per capita. The share of the population unemployed imposes a negative 
impact on education expenditures as well. A one percent increase in the population unemployed leads to 
about $11.1 per capita less available for schools. The coefficient on enrollment is positive and significant. 
A one percent increase in enrollment increases school spending by about $9. We find significantly positive 
effects of both reform variables on state educational expenditures. Property tax reforms in the three states 





difference estimates of α1 and α2 are smaller and not statistically significant.58 The 
coefficient estimate of α3 is about 0.30, though not statistically significant in any model. 
We find it likely that earmarking increases spending at less than a dollar for dollar rate, 
which suggests that a fraction of the earmarked dollar may leak out and be spent on other 
purposes. However, large standard errors prevent us from measuring the effect precisely. 
Using first difference and 3-year difference estimator, the evaluated probability of α1 > 
α2 becomes smaller and the probability that the earmarked money is fungible (α1 < 1) is 
about 90 percent. However, the 5-year difference estimator produces a higher probability 
of α1 > α2 and a lower probability of α1 < 1, compared to the fixed effect estimator.  
In Table 4-3, we present estimated coefficients of equation (4-1) and (4-2) using 
sub-sample 2 of the “Changers” and the “General Revenue” groups. We find the 
coefficient on α1 ranging between 0.72 and 0.78. Out of every extra dollar of earmarked 
lottery profits, about three quarters find its way into K-12 education. In contrast, the 
coefficient on α2 is uniformly smaller, indicating that an extra dollar out of non-
earmarked lottery profits raises K-12 spending by only 37 cents. In this sub-sample, 
results are more similar across the four specifications  the within-group estimator 
produces similar results to the short- and long-term difference estimators.  
In the middle of Table 4-3, we report the F-test on the hypothesis that impacts on 
educational expenditures are the same whether the money is earmarked or not. Although 
the point estimate of α1 is almost twice the scale of α2, the hypothesis cannot be rejected 
                                                 
58Although our regression results suggest that earmarking funnels a larger fraction of a lottery dollar into 
education, we can reject the hypothesis that K-12 spending increases dollar for dollar with earmarked 
profits. In other words, substitution of earmarked money for other purposes exists to a certain extent. It is 
reasonable to assume such adjustments in state budgets take place over a longer period. Thus we decide to 




with a p-value of 0.05 because of the large standard error on the coefficient α1. The large 
standard error is driven by the fact that we have only nine states in the treatment group. 
The Bayesian inference probabilities provide more convincing evidence that the 
probability of α1 > α2 is about 87 percent. There is a 70 percent chance that α1 is less 
than one, which suggests that earmarking increases spending, though not at a dollar for 
dollar rate. 
Overall, we find in our regressions that about 60-80 cents out of every dollar is 
spent on public education if the money is earmarked for K-12 schools. Our findings are 
consistent with the large literature in public finance on the “flypaper effect,” as well as 
the results in Novarro (2002). According to economic theory, intergovernmental grants 
are equivalent to increases in income and these grants should not increase spending by 
more than an equal increase in income. In a regression with some per capita spending 
category as the outcome variable, the coefficient on per capita income is usually 
somewhere in the range of 0.05 to 0.10  indicating that for every dollar in income, 
categorical spending increases by five to ten cents. However, dozens of studies in the 
“flypaper effect” literature have demonstrated that money “sticks where it hits.” Hines et 
al. (1995) review a number of empirical tests of the flypaper effect and conclude that 
unrestricted block grants do increase spending dollar for dollar. Though in a different 
context, the stickiness of the money found in our regression falls into the range of the 
flypaper effect found in the previous studies (Gramlich 1977).  
Another result we find interesting is that states on average spend about 17 to 18 
percent of their total budget on public education, but the marginal non-earmarked lottery 




that in the states of the “General Revenue” group, each additional dollar from lottery 
profits generates about 40 to 50 cents in educational spending. The difference between 
the marginal and average propensities to spend on public education suggests that public 
school spending has some priority in the budgetary process when it comes to determining 
expenditures out of lottery profits. To provide further evidence on this distinction, we 
compare the impacts on school expenditures of lottery money with the impacts of other 
“sin taxes,” such as the tobacco tax and alcohol revenues. Alcohol revenues are 
constructed from the summation of liquor store profits and revenues from alcoholic 
beverage taxes in each state. As indicated above, tobacco and alcohol revenues together 
generate about the same amount of money for states as lottery profits. We re-run the 
regressions of equations (4-1) and (4-2) adding the variable of “sin taxes.” Results are 
presented in Table 4-4. 
The upper panel of Table 4-4 contains estimates using sub-sample 1, while the 
lower panel contains estimates using sub-sample 2. As we can see, adding sin taxes into 
the regression does not change the significance and scale of the point estimates of α1, α2, 
and α3. The effects of sin taxes on state school expenditures are generally not significant, 
and the point estimates are on average not larger than the average propensity to spend on 
schools. As a source of revenue, lottery profits constitute about the same proportion of 
the total state budget as tobacco tax and alcohol revenue. However, the contribution to 
school expenditure is larger from lottery profits than from the other sin taxes.  
It should be noted that most states experienced a steady decline in alcohol 




taxes. After fitting a state specific time trend, there may not be much within state 
variation left to identify its impact on school expenditure. 
As we discussed in the previous section, standard errors estimated in the 
conventional fixed effects model could be biased due to serial correlation in error terms. 
To obtain robust estimates of the standard error, we apply the econometric method 
suggested by Anderson & Hsiao (1982) to correct for serial correlation in error terms, and 
report the robust estimates in the right column of Table 4-5. Corresponding estimates 
from conventional fixed effects model are recorded in the left column. As expected, 
conventional fixed-effects estimates tends to understate the standard error. Although 
estimates obtained from robust estimation are less significant than their counterparts from 
conventional fixed effects model, the scale of point estimates of α1 is still larger than that 
of the point estimate of α2. 
In the upper panel we report estimates obtained using sub-sample 1. The robust 
estimate of α1 is of the same scale as the fixed effects estimates, statistically significant 
with a p-value of 0.031. The robust estimate of α2 is smaller than its counterpart in the 
left column, and the robust estimate of α3 is larger than the corresponding fixed effects 
estimates. Both the robust estimates of α2 and α3 are not statistically significant at 95 
percent confidence. In the lower panel, we report robust estimates using sub-sample 2. 
The robust estimates of α1 and α2 are smaller than the conventional fixed effects 
estimates, with a p-value of 0.083 and 0.389 separately.  




4.5.2 Anecdotal Evidence on Possible Selection Bias 
Some may argue that states earmarking lottery profits for education would spend 
more overall on schools than states not earmarking, even in the absence of earmarking. In 
other words, those states that have a higher propensity to spend on public education are 
more likely to earmark lottery profits for education anyway. If this were the case, our 
estimates of the earmarking effects would be contaminated without controlling for factors 
that lead to the selection. The selection bias is most relevant in states that changed the 
allocation of lottery profits from general revenue to school funds in sub-sample 2. We 
should note that this type of selection bias would tend to generate a large coefficient for 
earmarked lottery dollars over non-earmarked dollars, but it would not explain why we 
obtain a coefficient on earmarked dollars that is less than 1. 
To get an idea of the extent to which our estimated coefficients may be 
contaminated, we look for historical reasons that the five states in sub-sample 2 may have 
altered the allocation of lottery profits. As shown in Table 2-1, Montana changed the 
allocation of net lottery revenue from K-12 schools to the general revenue fund in 1996. 
The other four states, Illinois, Missouri, Oregon and Texas, switched from general 
revenue to K-12 school funds. 
As outlined in the conclusion, Montana moved from earmarking to non-
earmarking because some educators believed that earmarking was generating the illusion 
that the state was spending more on K-12 schools than it actually was. 
In Missouri, when the state lottery was authorized in 1984, the legislation did not 




believe so during the campaign for the initiation of lottery.59 Later, voters found out that 
the money was put into state general revenues and was used for all state services, with 
elementary and secondary education getting only about 26 percent.60 In August 1992, 
Amendment 11 was passed, earmarking state lottery proceeds for public education. It 
should be pointed out that prior to the approval of Amendment 11, voters rejected an 
amendment seeking to raise property taxes for education. In the previous year, voters also 
rejected Proposition B to raise income tax for education. In other words, it is clear that in 
Missouri, voters wanted lottery profits spent on education; it is, however, not clear that 
they wanted more money overall spent on education. 
When the Texas lottery was adopted in 1992, the majority of Texans believed that 
the fund would be set aside for the Texas school system. Lottery profits were, however, 
deposited into the general fund.61 In 1997, Governor G. W. Bush proposed to cut school 
property taxes and at the same time increase the state tax. However, opposition to a tax 
hike was so strong that State Representative Williamson suggested putting $1 billion plus 
annual lottery proceeds into the Permanent School Fund.62 Effective September 1, 1997, 
all lottery profits was allocated to the Foundation School Fund. 
In Oregon, lottery proceeds had been allocated to economic development since 
1985. However, in 1990, Measure 5 was approved to cut local property tax. The state 
government was then expected to cover budget shortfalls in school expenditures.63 To 
deal with this anticipated shortfall, the legislature included educational expenditures as 
                                                 
59 “Schools get full cut of gambling money,” 04/26/1993, Five Star Edition. 
60 “Parents back tow measures amendments would aid schools with easier taxation methods,” 07/27/1992, 
Five Star Edition. 
61 “Lottery’s millions could be for schools,” 05/01/1997, ALAMO. 
62 “Lottery earnings proposed for school fund,” 03/06/1997, Austin American-Statesman. 
63 “Carving up the lottery,” 12/11/1995, Portland Oregonian. 




part of economic development programs. More than half of the lottery profits were spent 
on education.64 Lawmakers worried about legal challenges based on the expansive 
definition of economic development, so they proposed a constitutional amendment 
(Measure 21) that linked the lottery to education and resolved the uncertainty. Measure 
21 was passed and the financing of public education was added to the allowable uses of 
lottery proceeds. The case of Oregon does not pose much of a concern about selection 
bias in our work. First, because Oregon is one of the states with major property tax 
reform, we control for the shift of more spending at the state level with our property tax 
reform legislative dummy variables. Second, the shift to more state support for K-12 
education occurs in 1990 in Oregon, but the earmarking policy did not start until 1997, 
during the last fiscal year of our sample. 
The state that is most likely to cause selection bias in our “Changers” sample is 
Illinois. In 1985, the Illinois General Assembly passed wide-ranging reforms in state 
schools. Lottery profits, together with an increase in the tax on cigarettes and a tax on 
interstate telephone calls, were collected to support the reform. If Illinois posed selection 
bias, then our estimates of α1 would be biased upwards. However, we re-run the 
regression without the state of Illinois and obtain even larger estimates for the earmarking 
states. 
The basic results in Tables 4-2 and 4-3 are not sensitive to major alterations of the 
model. If we aggregate state revenues allocated to K-12 education over all states, we can 
see that total state revenues per capita allocated to K-12 education are flat in the early 
1980s, and then increase steadily thereafter. To determine whether our results are 
                                                 




sensitive to different sample periods, we restrict our sample period 1983–1998, and re-
run the regressions using the two sub-samples. We find no significant change in our 
estimates. As a second specification test, we alter the composition of our control sample. 
In the previous regressions, we use the “General Revenue” group as a control group. To 
help establish the underlying trend in K-12 revenues, we expand the sample to include 
those states without the lottery and find no significant change in the estimates of the 
impacts of lottery profits. 
 
4.6 An Alternative Model: Two-Stage Least Squares 
The models outlined in the previous section are intuitively appealing because they 
measure within state correlation in lottery profits and K-12 spending where the 
unexplained period-to-period movements in lottery profits identify the models. The 
shortcoming of the models is that, they leave unexplained exactly why there are changes 
in lottery profits. In this section, we model more closely the period-to-period changes in 
lottery profits and use this information to examine the impact of earmarked profits. 
As mentioned in section II, there are several major within-state developments 
over time that can quickly change per capita lottery profits, including the introduction of 
a state lottery, the introduction of new games, and the legalization of other gambling 
within a state. These discrete events should lead to a “first-stage” relationship between 
the events and lottery profits. The positive or negative shock to lottery profits should 
eventually lead to a change in expenditures on K-12 education. Comparing the impact 
that the shock has on lottery profits and its eventual impact on K-12 education should 




example, if the introduction of a Lotto-style game increases profits by $20 per person and 
K-12 spending by $15 per person, then one could conclude that 75 cents of every new 
dollar in lottery profits is destined for education. 
There are, however, several factors that may complicate this type of analysis. 
First, the comparison of the “first-stage” and “reduced-forms” outlined above is 
straightforward only when looking at one discrete event in isolation. In practice, there are 
many events that we can measure that should change lottery profits. Consequently, we 
need an alternative model that will allow us to aggregate results over many events. In this 
instance, we can think of the discrete events as instruments for lottery profits in an 
educational expenditure equation and use two-stage least squares to tie the first-stage and 
reduced-form together. In the 2SLS model, predicted lottery profit is entered into the 
equation of interest. Angrist et al. (1996) argue that 2SLS can be thought of as a local 
average treatment effect that measures the impact of the covariate of interest (lottery 
profits) on the outcome (K-12 spending) for those observations whose behavior has 
changed as a result of receiving the treatment. In this case, the 2SLS coefficient on lottery 
profits will measure the change in K-12 spending when lottery profits change by a dollar 
as a result of the discrete events. A second complicating factor is that we have two types 
of states (those that earmark profits and those that do not) and, given the results in the 
previous section, we suspect that the first-stage and reduced-form relationships might 
vary across these groups. Consequently, we will estimate models for these two groups 
separately. 
We have identified a number of events that should alter per capita lottery profits 




have lotteries throughout the entire period whereas some states have only introduced a 
lottery recently. The first variable we construct is a simple indicator that equals one in 
years the lottery is in operation and zero otherwise. Many states adopt lotteries in stages, 
first introducing instant games and daily numbers, then larger jackpot games, such as 
lotto and multi-state games. The second variable we construct is another dummy variable 
that equals one beginning in the first year a state runs an in-state lotto game. As Cook and 
Clotfelter (1989) discuss, the success of lotto games is predicated on having large 
jackpots. When the jackpot is not claimed in a particular drawing, the prize rolls over to 
the next drawing. The number of lotto players is highly nonlinear in the size of the 
jackpot. Many smaller states that run lotto games never see jackpots in the tens-of-
millions-of-dollar-range on their in-state lotto games. As a result, a number of smaller 
states joined together in order to offer multi-state lotto games, pooling population across 
borders and increasing the likelihood of larger jackpots in an attempt to increase profits. 
There are now three major multi-state lotto games: Power Ball, the Big Game and Hot 
Lotto. We construct a dummy variable that equals one when a multi-state lotto game is in 
operation in a state. Some states have installed video lottery terminals (VLTs) in bars, 
restaurants and racetracks where people can play poker, blackjack, keno and bingo over 
the terminals. We include a dummy variable that equals one beginning at the time of the 
installation of VLTs in a state. Finally, there has been tremendous growth in casino style 
gaming in this country since 1978. Prior to that time, casinos were only legal in Nevada. 
In 1978, the casinos in Atlantic City opened for the first time. Since then, there has been 
an explosion in the number of states that allow casino gaming. There are two major types 




Gaming and Regulatory Act in 1978 allows tribes in some states to run casinos. There are 
more than 220 Las Vegas-style casinos on Indian reservations. Second, some states have 
also allowed gaming on riverboats and racetracks. There are now casinos operations in 
twenty-four states other than Nevada and New Jersey. Evans et al. (2002) have 
constructed a master list of these casinos with their zip odes and opening dates. We use 
this list to identify counties with casinos and the date at which they opened. We include 
as a covariate in these regressions the fraction of people living in counties with a casino. 
In the bottom portion of Table 4-6, we report the results of the first-stage 
regression for states in the “K-12” and “General Revenue” groups separately. As in the 
previous regressions, state and year fixed effects, state specific time trends, and all other 
covariates used are included in the regression. In the table, we report the coefficients on 
the events that potentially could alter per capita lottery profits. In the left column of K-12 
states, we can see that the adoption of the lottery increases total profits by $23 per person, 
the adoption of an in-state lotto game adds an additional $17 per person, and the adoption 
of a multi-state lotto game increases net revenues by a statistically significant $11 per 
person. The p-value for the F-test on the significance of the instruments in the first-stage 
regression is less than 0.001. Using 2SLS, our estimated earmarking effect is 0.785, close 
to the within-group estimates reported in Table 4-4.  
We apply the same estimation procedure to the fifteen “General Revenue” states 
and add VLTs as another instrument. There are four states in this group that introduced 
video lottery games in the early 90s: Delaware, South Dakota, Rhode Island and West 
Virginia. The introduction of VLTs increases lottery profits by $47 per person. We find a 




of multi-state lotto games. The p-value for the F-test on the significance of the 
instruments in the first-stage regression is less than 0.001. The coefficient on lottery 
profits that are deposited into the general fund is 0.585, which is close to our previous 
estimates from Table 4-2. In the 2SLS estimations using the “K-12” and “General 
Revenue” groups separately, the p-values on the test of over-identifying restrictions are 
rather large and we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the models are correctly 
specified. 
It is worth noting that although Powerball65 and the Big Game66 are the well-
known lotto games among states, introducing these games do not guarantee a boost in 
lottery profits. Just examining the time series of lottery profits in a few states, we find 
noticeable drops in lottery profits after Maryland and Virginia adopted the Big Game and 
a sharp decline in profits in Idaho after it adopted Lotto America, the precursor to 
Powerball. It may be the case that multi-state lotto games like Powerball and the Big 
Game cannibalize other lottery games. 
 
4.7 Conclusion 
Although state lotteries have been a financial success, some voters and elected 
officials are hesitant to allow states into the gambling business. A popular device to 
encourage support for lotteries has been to earmark profits for particular program. Of the 
thirty-eight states with lotteries, twenty-five states currently earmark monies with the vast 
                                                 
65 In the “K-12” group, four states have joined the Powerball, including Georgia, Idaho, New Hampshire, 
and New Mexico. In the “General Revenue” group, ten states have joined the Powerball game, including 
Arizona, Connecticut, Delaware, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Rhode Island, South Dakota, and 
West Virginia. 
66 Georgia and Michigan in the “K-12” group, and Maryland and Virginia in the “General Revenue” group 




majority of these states using profits for K-12 education. The effectiveness of earmarking 
has, however, been questioned by many. The concerns about earmarking are illustrated 
nicely in the history of the Montana lottery. When Montana began the lottery in 1987, 
lottery profits were earmarked for public education. In 1995, the state legislature 
decoupled lottery profits from school financing. As the President of the Montana 
Education Association noted, it was an “illusion” that lottery profits were a big help to 
public schools. Although the lottery transferred almost $42 million directly into school 
funding between 1987 and 1994, the amount was less than 1 percent of the total state 
school budget during the same period.67 
Whether earmarking increases spending is, in the end, an empirical question. Our 
paper addresses this issue by examining the experiences of lottery states over the past 
twenty years. Given previous evidence on the “flypaper effect,” it is not surprising that 
we find up to three quarters of an earmarked lottery dollar finds its way to public schools. 
There is a high probability that a dollar of earmarked lottery profits generates more 
spending on K-12 schools than the spending generated from a dollar of lottery profits put 
into the general fund. It is also interesting to note that, states with lotteries spend a larger 
share of the marginal lottery dollar on education than income generated from other 
sources, such as alcohol and cigarette taxes.68 Though our findings suggest that 
earmarking lottery profits for K-12 education increases school spending, a handsome 
fraction of earmarked money is fungible. There is a high likelihood that a dollar of 
earmarked lottery profits generates less than a dollar of spending on K-12 education. 
                                                 
67 “Chancey revenues: A review of gambling in Montana,” 01/01/1995, Montana Business Quarterly. 
68 It should be pointed out that lottery profits are a small fraction of total spending on public education. 
Even though earmarking makes a large proportion of lottery profits available for public schools, lottery 




Chapter 5: Concluding Remarks 
  
Lotteries are not only a popular source of state revenue, but also are products 
marketed and sold to the general public directly by the state government. Although it is 
the statutory duty of a lottery agency to maximize net revenues, the lottery agency’s 
ability to maximize profits is limited due to state regulations such as specifications of 
lottery payout ratios, caps on lottery advertising budgets, and the annual review of 
advertising budgets. Contrary to the public concern that states over-spend on lottery 
advertising, our results suggest that if the goal is to maximize profits, most states spend 
too little on lottery advertising. We should note that our conclusions are drawn on 
positive analysis, the social optimal scale of lottery advertising might be smaller than the 
scale that maximizes profits if the distributional impact of lottery provision is taken into 
consideration. 
Another interesting result of this dissertation is that we find evidence that 
earmarking alters a state's spending pattern. When a state decides to earmark lottery 
profits for public education, it is usually stipulated in state codes that lottery profits 
should supplement not substitute current spending on public schools. But it is often 
doubted that earmarked money is fungible. Analyzing the experiences of state lotteries in 
the past twenty years, we find that earmarking is a binding constraint on state budgetary 















Arizona 1981 General Revenue1 -  
 
California 1985 K-12 Education -  




Connecticut 1972 General Revenue -  
Washington 
DC 1982 General Revenue -  
 
Delaware 1975 General Revenue   
 
Florida 1988 Education -  
 
Georgia 1993 Education -  
 
Idaho 1989 Education (K-12 50%) -  
 




Indiana 1989 General Revenue1 -  
 
Iowa 1985 General Revenue -  
Kansas 1987 
Economic Development (85%) 
Prison (15%) -  
 
Kentucky 1989 General Revenue1 -  
 
Louisiana 1991 General Revenue -  
 
Maine 1974 General Revenue -  
 
Maryland 1973 General Revenue -  
 
Massachusetts 1972 Cities and Towns -  
 
Michigan 1972 K-12 Education -  
Minnesota 1990 
General Revenue (60%) 














Missouri 1986 General Revenue 1992 Education 





Compulsive Gamblers -  
New 
Hampshire 1964 K-12 Education -  
 
New Jersey 1970 Education and Institution -  
 
New Mexico 1996 Education -  
 
New York 1967 K-12 Education -  
 
Ohio 1974 K-12 Education -  




Pennsylvania 1972 Senior Citizens Program -  
 
Rhode Island 1974 General Revenue1 -  
South 
Carolina 2002 Education -  
 
South Dakota 1987 General Revenue1 -  
 
Texas 1992 General Revenue 1997 K-12 Education
 
Vermont 1978 General Revenue 1998 K-12 Education
 
Virginia 1988 General Revenue 1999 K-12 Education
 
Washington 1982 General Revenue 2001 K-12 Education
 
Source: State Lottery webpage, State Lottery Publications, and State Lottery Laws. 
 
1 Lottery profits are treated as general revenue if the money is allocated to general 
revenue fund and other expenditure funds without a specific share arrangement. Source: 




Table 2-2    State Law on Lottery 
 
 
State State Codes  Administrative Nature  
 
Arizona Title 5 Chap. 5  Independent agency 
 
California Title 2 Div. 1 Chap.12.5 Independent agency 
 
Colorado 24-35-205(7) C.R.S. Within Dept. of Revenue  
 
Connecticut Chap. 229a Within Dept. of Revenue Services 
 
Delaware Chap. 348, Vol. 59. Within Dept. of Finance  
 
Florida Title IV Chap. 25 Independent agency 
 
Georgia 50-27 Independent agency 
 
Idaho Title 67  Independent agency 
 
Illinois 20 ILCS 1605 Independent agency 
 
Indiana IC4-30-1 Chap. 1 Independent agency 
 
Iowa  Chap. 99E  Within Dept. of Revenue & Finance 
 
Kansas K.S.A. 74-8701 -- 8732 Independent agency 
 
Kentucky 154A. Independent agency 
 
Louisiana RS 47: §9001 Independent agency 
 
Maine Title 8 Chap.14A 
Within Dept. of Administrative and 
Financial Services  
 
Maryland Art. 88D §§ 7, 8 Independent agency 
 
Massachusetts  Within Dept. of State Treasurer 
 
Michigan Lottery Act 432 Within the Department of Treasury 
 
Minnesota 349A Independent agency 
 
Missouri 313 Within Dept. of Revenue  
 




Table 2-2    State Law on Lottery (Continued) 
 
 
State State Codes  Administrative Nature  
 
Nebraska REG 408 Within Dept. of Revenue 
 
New Hampshire XXIV 284: 21  Independent agency 
 
New Jersey 5:09 Within the Dept. of the Treasury  
 
New Mexico 6-24 Independent agency 
 
New York 
Tax Law 1909Chap. 60 
34 s1600-20 
Within the Dept. of Taxation and 
Finance  
 
Ohio 37-70 Independent agency 
 
Oregon ORS461.2  Independent agency 
 
Pennsylvania PA Code V Independent agency 
 
Rhode Island 42-61 Independent agency 
 
South Carolina 59-150 Independent agency 
 
South Dakota 42-7A Independent agency 
 
Texas Code, Chap. 466. Independent agency 
 
Vermont 31-14 Independent agency 
 
Virginia 58.1-402.2E.  Independent agency 
 
Washington RCW 67.70 Independent agency 
 
West Virginia 29-22 Independent agency 
 
Wisconsin Chap. 565 Within Dept. of Revenue 
 




Table 2-3    Net Gambling Revenues by Industry, 1982 and 2000 
 
 Net Revenues in Billions of 
constant 1995-6 dollars  
(Industry market share) 
Industry 1982 2000 
 















Native American gambling ----- $9.5 
(17.0%) 
River boat casinos ----- $8.2 
(14.6%) 




Total $17.1 $56.2 
 











Total monthly ticket sales per capita 10.452 (7.084) 
Total monthly advertising per capita 0.039 (0.031) 
Monthly state personal income (average) 8,235.09 (1,241.90) 
Monthly state unemployment rate 5.024 (1.503) 
Share of state population aged 18-21 0.075 (0.011) 
Share of state population aged 22-29 0.148 (0.020) 
Share of state population aged 30-44 0.327 (0.025) 
Share of state population aged 45-65 0.285 (0.024) 
Share of state white population 0.883 (0.083) 
Share of state Black population 0.085 (0.081) 
Share of state Hispanic population 0.061 (0.079) 
Share of state population with some high-school 
education 0.104 (0.021) 
Share of state population of high-school graduates 0.344 (0.042) 
Share of state population with some college education 0.265 (0.037) 
Share of state population of college graduates 0.224 (0.043) 
Share of population living in the central city and balance 
of MSA area 0.697 (0.220) 
Share of state male population 0.481 (0.012) 
Share of state married population 0.593 (0.030) 
  
Number of states 37 
Number of observations 4682 
 
Sources: La Fleur’s  
  Competitive Media Reporting Company 
  Bureau of Economic Analysis 
  U.S. Census Bureau 




Table 3-2    Comparison of Average Monthly Sales and Advertising Spending of Illinois 
State Lottery Before and After the TV Commercial Restriction 
 
Mean and (Standard Deviation) 











T Value  



































     





Table 3-3    Interrupted Time Series Analysis of Sales and Advertising Spending of 
Illinois State Lottery Before and After the TV Commercial Restriction 
 
Parameter Estimates and (Standard Errors) 
  
Ads Spending Per Capita 
 
Log (Sales Per Capita) 
 













Durbin-Watson Test Statistics (P-value for testing positive autocorrelation) 
 
















Mean of the Dependent Variable 0.052 2.345 
Number of Observations 126 126 
R2 0.151 0.412 
 
The covariates included in the regression model are monthly time trend and the 
interaction term of advertising reduction dummy variable with the monthly time trend. 
Estimated parameters of monthly time trend and D-W test statistics do not change 




Table 3-4    2SLS Estimates of the Effect of Advertising on Sales Using TV Commercial 
Restriction in Illinois as Instruments (States with Similar Pre-treatment Trends as 
Controls) 
 
Parameter Estimates and (Standard Errors) 
Variable Coefficient 
 OLS Robust OLS a 
Control by states with similar pre-treatment trend in log(per capita sales) and per 
capita Ads spending: AZ CA CT FL ID IN IA KY LA ME MN MT NE NH NJ NM OR. 
First-Stage Estimate 
Treatment Dummy  -0.023 (0.004)  -0.022 (0.006) 
 
Reduced-Form Estimate 
Treatment Dummy -0.099 (0.038) -0.091 (0.046) 
 
2SLS Estimate 
Per Capita Advertising Expenditure 4.242 (1.722)  4.117 (2.239) 
 
R2  0.888 0.915 
Number of Observations 1974 1889 
Control by states with similar pre-treatment trend in log(per capita sales) and per 
capita Ads spending excluding neighbor states: AZ CA CT FL ID LA ME MN MT NE 
NH NJ NM OR. 
First-Stage Estimate 
Treatment Dummy -0.023 (0.004)  -0.022 (0.006) 
 
Reduced-Form Estimates 
Treatment Dummy -0.093 (0.040) -0.088 (0.048) 
 
2SLS Estimate 
Per Capita Advertising Expenditure 4.114 (1.881)  4.051 (2.389) 
 
R2  0.894 0.990 
Number of Observations 1608 1532 
We include year and month effects in the model. Other covariates include state personal 
income per capita, state unemployment rate, share of population aged 18-21, share of 
population aged 22-29, share of population aged 30-44, share of population aged 45-65, 
share of white population, share of Black population, share of Hispanic population, share 
of population living in the central city or balance of the MSA area, share of population 
married, share of male population, share of population with some high school, share of 
population with high school diploma, share of population with some college, share of 
population with college diploma, linear, quadratic and cubic term of jackpot size of the 
Big Game and Powerball, and a set of dummy variables of lottery game structures. 
 





Table 3-5    Calculated Sales Elasticity and Gross Rate of Return to Advertising __ 
Illinois Case 
 




Robust OLS Estimates 
 
Semi-elasticity Estimated  
in the Upper Panel of Table 3-4 4.242 (1.722) 4.117 (2.239) 
   
 
Average Ads Spending and Sales in the Treatment Period 
 
Average Ads Spending per capita  
in the Treatment Period 0.039 (0.024) 0.039 (0.024) 
 
Average Sales per capita  
in the Treatment Period 8.967 (1.389) 8.967 (1.389) 
  
 
Calculated Elasticity and Gross Rate of Return to Advertising 
 
Elasticity of Sales to Advertising 0.165 0.161 
 





Table 3-6    2SLS Estimates of the Effect of Advertising on Sales Using TV Commercial 
Restriction in Illinois as Instruments (States with Similar Game Mix as Controls) 
 
Parameter Estimates and (Standard Errors) 
Variable Coefficient 
 OLS Robust OLS a 
 
Control by states with Big Game: GA MD MI VA as controls. 
First-Stage Estimate 
Treatment Dummy -0.033 (0.008) -0.034 (0009) 
 
Reduced-Form Estimates 
Treatment Dummy -0.113 (0.045) -0.116 (0.040) 
 
2SLS Estimate 
Per Capita Advertising Expenditure 3.461 (1.569) 3.374 (1.350) 
 
R2 0.776 0.757 
Number of Observations 610 592 
 
Control by states without Keno Game: AZ CT DE FL ID IN IA KY LA ME MN MO MT 
NE NH NJ NM OH PA TX VA WI. 
First-Stage Estimate 
Treatment Dummy -0.014 (0.004) -0.017 (0.006) 
 
Reduced-Form Estimates 
Treatment Dummy -0.069 (0.038) -0.089 (0.042) 
 
2SLS Estimate 
Per Capita Advertising Expenditure 4.854 (2.899) 5.198 (2.907) 
 
R2 0.864 0.925 
Number of Observations 2521 2421 
We include year and month effects in the model. Other covariates include state personal 
income per capita, state unemployment rate, share of population aged 18-21, share of 
population aged 22-29, share of population aged 30-44, share of population aged 45-65, 
share of white population, share of Black population, share of Hispanic population, share 
of population living in the central city or balance of the MSA area, share of population 
married, share of male population, share of population with some high school, share of 
population with high school diploma, share of population with some college, share of 
population with college diploma, linear, quadratic and cubic term of jackpot size of the 
Big Game and Powerball, and a set of dummy variables of lottery game structures. 
 






Table 3-7    2SLS Estimates of the Effect of Advertising on Sales Using TV Commercial 
Restriction in Illinois as Instruments 
 
Parameter Estimates and (Standard Errors) 
Variable Coefficient 
 OLS Robust OLS a 
 
Control by all lottery states except MA and WA. 
 
First-Stage Estimate 
Treatment Dummy -0.014 (0.005)  0.016 (0.005) 
 
Reduced-Form Estimates 
Treatment Dummy -0.136 (0.036)  -0.132 (0.039) 
 
2SLS Estimate 
Per Capita Advertising Expenditure 9.804 (3.943)  8.127 (3.478) 
 
R2 0.767 0.876 
Number of Observations 3713 3580 
 
Control by non-neighboring states: all states except IA IN KY MO WI MA and WA. 
 
First-Stage Estimate 
Treatment Dummy -0.013 (0.005)  -0.017 (0.006) 
 
Reduced-Form Estimates 
Treatment Dummy -0.114 (0.037)  -0.110 (0.043) 
 
2SLS Estimate 
Per Capita Advertising Expenditure 8.531 (3.922)  6.488 (3.258) 
 
R2 0.799 0.881 
Number of Observations 3095 2977 
We include year and month effects in the model. Other covariates include state personal 
income per capita, state unemployment rate, share of population aged 18-21, share of 
population aged 22-29, share of population aged 30-44, share of population aged 45-65, 
share of white population, share of Black population, share of Hispanic population, share 
of population living in the central city or balance of the MSA area, share of population 
married, share of male population, share of population with some high school, share of 
population with high school diploma, share of population with some college, share of 
population with college diploma, linear, quadratic and cubic term of jackpot size of the 
Big Game and Powerball, and a set of dummy variables of lottery game structures. 
 





Table 3-8    Estimates of the Retention Rate of Advertising __ Illinois Case 
 
Parameter Estimates and (Standard Errors) 
 Estimated Coefficient 
 
Including Ads Spending of the Past 12 Months in the Regression of Equation (3-4) 
 
Short-term Advertising Effect (λ0)  1.405 (1.146) 
Retention Rate (δ) 0.627 (0.334) 
 
Including Ads Spending of the Past 11 Months in the Regression of Equation (3-4) 
 
Short-term Advertising Effect (λ0)  1.420 (1.136) 
Retention Rate (δ) 0.626 (0.329) 
 
Including Ads Spending of the Past 10 Months in the Regression of Equation (3-4) 
 
Short-term Advertising Effect (λ0)  1.256(1.065) 
Retention Rate (δ) 0.664 (0.323) 
 
Including Ads Spending of the Past 9 Months in the Regression of Equation (3-4) 
 
Short-term Advertising Effect (λ0)  1.650 (1.330) 
Retention Rate (δ) 0.554 (0.372) 
 
Including Ads Spending of the Past 8 Months in the Regression of Equation (3-4) 
 
Short-term Advertising Effect (λ0) 1.564 (1.272) 
Retention Rate (δ) 0.579 (0.364) 
 
We include year and month effects in the model. Other covariates include state personal 
income per capita, state unemployment rate, share of population aged 18-21, share of 
population aged 22-29, share of population aged 30-44, share of population aged 45-65, 
share of white population, share of Black population, share of Hispanic population, share 
of population living in the central city or balance of the MSA area, share of population 
married, share of male population, share of population with some high school, share of 
population with high school diploma, share of population with some college, share of 
population with college diploma, linear, quadratic and cubic term of jackpot size of the 




Table 3-9    Comparison of Average Monthly Sales and Advertising Spending of 
Washington State Lottery in and out of the Summer TV Hiatus 
 
Mean and (Standard Deviation) 
($ per capita) 
 









T Value  


































     





Table 3-10   Interrupted Time Series Analysis of Sales and Advertising Spending of 
Washington State Lottery in and out of Summer TV Hiatus 
 
Parameter Estimates and (Standard Errors) 
  
Ad. Spending Per Capita 
 
Log (Sales Per Capita) 
 







   






















Mean of the Dependent Variable 0.036 1.755 
Number of Observations 132 132 
R2 0.145 0.011 
 
The covariates included in the regression model are monthly time trend and the 
interaction term of advertising reduction dummy variable with the monthly time trend. 
Estimated parameters of monthly time trend and D-W test statistics do not change 




Table 3-11   2SLS Estimates of the Effect of Advertising on Sales Using TV Hiatus in 
Washington as Instruments 
 
Parameter Estimates and (Standard Errors) 
Variable Coefficient 
 OLS Robust OLS a 
 
Control by all lottery states except IL and MA. 
 
First-Stage Estimate 
Treatment Dummy -0.024 (0.009) -0.023 (0.009) 
 
Reduced-Form Estimates 
Treatment Dummy -0.160 (0.073) -0.145 (0.063) 
 
2SLS Estimate 
Per Capita Advertising Expenditure 6.632 (3.695) 6.162 (3.390) 
 
R2  0.833 0.909 
Number of Observations 3906 3772 
 
Control by non-neighboring states: all lottery states except ID, OR, MA and IL. 
 
First-Stage Estimate 
Treatment Dummy -0.025 (0.009) -0.024 (0.009) 
Reduced-Form Estimates 
Treatment Dummy -0.160 (0.074) -0.139 (0.063) 
 
2SLS Estimate 
Per Capita Advertising Expenditure 6.406 (3.571) 5.865 (3.325) 
 
R2  0.837 0.917 
Number of Observations 3660 3535 
We include year and month effects in the model. Other covariates include state personal 
income per capita, state unemployment rate, share of population aged 18-21, share of 
population aged 22-29, share of population aged 30-44, share of population aged 45-65, 
share of white population, share of Black population, share of Hispanic population, share 
of population living in the central city or balance of the MSA area, share of population 
married, share of male population, share of population with some high school, share of 
population with high school diploma, share of population with some college, share of 
population with college diploma, linear, quadratic and cubic term of jackpot size of the 
Big Game and Powerball, and a set of dummy variables of lottery game structures. 
 






Table 3-12   Calculated Sales Elasticity and Gross Rate of Return to Advertising __ 
Washington Case 
 






Semi-elasticity Estimated  
in the Lower Panel of Table 3-10 6.406 (3.571) 5.865 (3.325) 
 
Average Ads Spending and Sales in the Treatment Period 
 
Average Ads Spending per capita  
in the Treatment Period 0.012 (0.006) 0.012 (0.006) 
 
Average Sales per capita in the 
Treatment Period 5.369 (1.295) 5.369 (1.295) 
   
 
Calculated Elasticity and Gross Rate of Return to Advertising 
 
Elasticity of Sales to Advertising 0.077 0.070 
 





Table 3-13   2SLS Estimates of the Effect of Advertising on Sales Using TV Hiatus in 
Washington as Instruments (States with Similar Game Mix as Controls) 
 
Parameter Estimates and (Standard Errors) 
Variable Coefficient 
 OLS Robust OLS a 
 
Control by states with Big Game: NJ NY OH as controls. 
 
First-Stage Estimate 
Treatment Dummy -0.020 (0.013) -0.019 (0.013) 
 
Reduced-Form Estimates 
Treatment Dummy -0.091 (0.071) -0.090 (0.069) 
 
2SLS Estimate 
Per Capita Advertising Expenditure 4.584 (4.408) 4.813 (4.707) 
 
R2  0.873 0.934 
Number of Observations 528 516 
 
Control by state Keno Game before 1993: CA KS MI OR. 
 
First-Stage Estimate 
Treatment Dummy -0.026 (0.008) -0.027 (0.008) 
 
Reduced-Form Estimates 
Treatment Dummy -0.111 (0.077) -0.100 (0.075) 
2SLS Estimate 
Per Capita Advertising Expenditure 4.205 (3.063) 3.771 (2.940) 
 
R2  0.815 0.677 
Number of Observations 660 645 
We include year and month effects in the model. Other covariates include state personal 
income per capita, state unemployment rate, share of population aged 18-21, share of 
population aged 22-29, share of population aged 30-44, share of population aged 45-65, 
share of white population, share of Black population, share of Hispanic population, share 
of population living in the central city or balance of the MSA area, share of population 
married, share of male population, share of population with some high school, share of 
population with high school diploma, share of population with some college, share of 
population with college diploma, linear, quadratic and cubic term of jackpot size of the 
Big Game and Powerball, and a set of dummy variables of lottery game structures. 
 






Table 3-14   Comparison of Average Monthly Sales and Advertising Spending of 
Massachusetts State Lottery Before and After Advertising Caps 
 
Mean and (Standard Deviation) 











T Value  























     























     





Table 3-15   Interrupted Time Series Analysis of Sales and Advertising Spending of 
Massachusetts State Lottery before and after Advertising Caps  
 
Parameter Estimates and (Standard Errors) 
































Durbin-Watson Test Statistics (P-value for testing positive autocorrelation) 
 
of order 1 
 
0.934    
(<.0001) 






of order 2 1.209    
(<.0001) 






of order 3 1.275 
(<.0001) 






     
Mean of the 
Dep. Variable 0.014 3.684 2.175 3.253 
Number of 
Observations 131 131 131 131 
R2 0.476 0.443 0.621 0.498 
 
The covariates included in the regression model are monthly time trend and the 
interaction term of advertising reduction dummy variable with the monthly time trend. 
Estimated parameters of monthly time trend and D-W test statistics do not change 




Table 3-16   Estimates of Impacts of Keno Introduction on Sales of Different Games 
 
Parameter Estimates and (Standard Errors) 
 





(Traditional Online Game) 
 
State-specific Regression a 
 
California 0.233 (0.074) 0.301 (0.066) -0.105 (0.111) 
 
Colorado 0.066 (0.065) 0.068 (0.054) 0.086 (0.120) 
 
Georgia 0.055 (0.055) 0.069 (0.083) -0.019 (0.099) 
 
Kansas 0.623 (0.090) 0.391 (0.096) 0.344 (0.154) 
 
Maryland 0.149 (0.057) 0.093 (0.080) -0.122 (0.083) 
 
New York 0.309 (0.053) 0.564 (0.122) 0.044 (0.053) 
 
West Virginia 0.336 (0.091) 0.002 (0.075) 0.259 (0.143) 
    
Pool of Keno States b 
 
All Keno 
states 0.119 (0.022) 0.142 (0.031) 0.007 (0.037) 
 
a. We include state personal income per capita, state unemployment rate and a dummy 
variable of keno introduction in the state-specific regression. 
 
b. We include year and month effects in the model. Other covariates include state 
personal income per capita, state unemployment rate, share of population aged 18-21, 
share of population aged 22-29, share of population aged 30-44, share of population aged 
45-65, share of white population, share of Black population, share of Hispanic 
population, share of population living in the central city or balance of the MSA area, 
share of population married, share of male population, share of population with some 
high school, share of population with high school diploma, share of population with some 
college, share of population with college diploma, linear, quadratic and cubic term of 





Table 3-17   2SLS Estimates of the Effect of Advertising on Sales of Traditional Online 
Games Using Advertising Caps in Massachusetts as Instruments (States with Similar Pre-
treatment Trend as Controls) 
 
Parameter Estimates and (Standard Errors) 
Variable Coefficient 
 OLS Robust OLS a 
Control by states with similar pre-treatment trend in log(per capita sales) and per 
capita Ads spending: all lottery states except AZ FL GA ID IL LA NY OR TX VA WA. 
First-Stage Estimate 
Treatment Dummy -0.075 (0.006) -0.066 (0.007) 
 
Reduced-Form Estimates 
Treatment Dummy -0.316 (0.063) -0.283 (0.066) 
 
2SLS Estimate 
Per Capita Advertising Expenditure 4.208 (0.889) 4.275 (1.055) 
 
R2  0.907 0.926 
Number of Observations 2766 2668 
Control by states with similar pre-treatment trend in log(per capita sales) and per 
capita Ads spending excluding neighbor states: all lottery states except AZ FL GA ID 
IL LA OR TX VA WA NY CT RI NH VT 
First-Stage Estimate 
Treatment Dummy -0.076 (0.006) -0.068 (0.007) 
 
Reduced-Form Estimates 
Treatment Dummy -0.271 (0.064) -0.228 (0.064) 
 
2SLS Estimate 
Per Capita Advertising Expenditure 3.592 (0.884) 3.357 (0.964) 
 
R2  0.915 0.926 
Number of Observations 2454 2364 
We include year and month effects in the model. Other covariates include state personal 
income per capita, state unemployment rate, share of population aged 18-21, share of 
population aged 22-29, share of population aged 30-44, share of population aged 45-65, 
share of white population, share of Black population, share of Hispanic population, share 
of population living in the central city or balance of the MSA area, share of population 
married, share of male population, share of population with some high school, share of 
population with high school diploma, share of population with some college, share of 
population with college diploma, linear, quadratic and cubic term of jackpot size of the 
Big Game and Powerball, and a set of dummy variables of lottery game structures. 
 





Table 3-18   Calculated Sales Elasticity and Gross Rate of Return to Advertising __ 
Massachusetts Case 
 
Parameter Estimates and (Standard Errors) 
  
OLS Robust OLS a 
 
Semi-elasticity Estimated  
in the Upper Panel of Table 3-10 4.208 (0.889) 4.275 (1.055) 
 
Average Ads Spending and Sales in the Treatment Period 
 
Average Ads Spending per capita  
in the Treatment Period 0.0025 (0.0027) 0.0025 (0.0027) 
 
Average Sales of Traditional Online 
Games per capita in the Treatment Period 8.403 (1.933) 8.403 (1.933) 
   
 
Calculated Elasticity and Gross Rate of Return to Advertising 
 
Elasticity of Sales to Advertising 0.011 0.011 
 







Table 3-19   2SLS Estimates of the Effect of Advertising on Sales of Traditional Online 
Games Using Advertising Caps in Massachusetts as Instruments (States with Similar 
Game Mix as Controls) 
 
Parameter Estimates and (Standard Errors) 
Variable Coefficient 
 OLS Robust OLS a 
 
Control by states with Big Game before 1996: GA MD MI VA as controls. 
First-Stage Estimate 
Treatment Dummy -0.045 (0.012) -0.046 (0.012) 
 
Reduced-Form Estimates 
Treatment Dummy -0.316 (0.099) -0.254 (0.086) 
 
2SLS Estimate 
Per Capita Advertising Expenditure 6.911 (2.700) 5.597 (2.237) 
 
R2  0.511 0.559 
Number of Observations 638 617 
 
Control by states with Keno Games before 1994: CA KS MD MI OR RI WV. 
First-Stage Estimate 
Treatment Dummy -0.077 (0.009) -0.070 (0.011) 
 
Reduced-Form Estimates 
Treatment Dummy -0.108 (0.114) -0.029 (0.102) 
 
2SLS Estimate 
Per Capita Advertising Expenditure 1.140 (1.479) 0.413 (1.460) 
 
R2  0.876 0.874 
Number of Observations 1017 987 
We include year and month effects in the model. Other covariates include state personal 
income per capita, state unemployment rate, share of population aged 18-21, share of 
population aged 22-29, share of population aged 30-44, share of population aged 45-65, 
share of white population, share of Black population, share of Hispanic population, share 
of population living in the central city or balance of the MSA area, share of population 
married, share of male population, share of population with some high school, share of 
population with high school diploma, share of population with some college, share of 
population with college diploma, linear, quadratic and cubic term of jackpot size of the 
Big Game and Powerball, and a set of dummy variables of lottery game structures. 
 






Table 3-20   2SLS Estimates of the Effect of Advertising on Sales of Traditional Online 
Games Using Advertising Caps in Massachusetts as Instruments 
 
Parameter Estimates and (Standard Errors) 
Variable Coefficient 
 OLS Robust OLS a 
 
Control by all lottery states except IL and WA. 
 
First-Stage Estimate 
Treatment Dummy -0.081 (0.006) -0.072 (0.007) 
 
Reduced-Form Estimates 
Treatment Dummy -0.325 (0.060) -0.236 (0.061) 
 
2SLS Estimate 
Per Capita Advertising Expenditure 3.985 (0.773) 3.280 (0.875) 
 
R2  0.898 0.907 
Number of Observations 3892 3755 
 
Control by non-neighboring states: all lottery states except IL WA NY CT RI NH and 
VT. 
First-Stage Estimate 
Treatment Dummy -0.068 (0.006) -0.058 (0.007) 
 
Reduced-Form Estimates 
Treatment Dummy -0.309 (0.063) -0.204 (0.065) 
 
2SLS Estimate 
Per Capita Advertising Expenditure 4.509 (0.964) 3.526 (1.154) 
 
R2  0.896 0.901 
Number of Observations 3448 3323 
We include year and month effects in the model. Other covariates include state personal 
income per capita, state unemployment rate, share of population aged 18-21, share of 
population aged 22-29, share of population aged 30-44, share of population aged 45-65, 
share of white population, share of Black population, share of Hispanic population, share 
of population living in the central city or balance of the MSA area, share of population 
married, share of male population, share of population with some high school, share of 
population with high school diploma, share of population with some college, share of 
population with college diploma, linear, quadratic and cubic term of jackpot size of the 
Big Game and Powerball, and a set of dummy variables of lottery game structures. 
 





Table 3-21   Estimates of the Retention Rate of Advertising __ Massachusetts Case 
 
Parameter Estimates and (Standard Errors) 
 Estimated Coefficient 
Including Ads Spending of the Past 12 Months in the Regression of Equation (3-4) 
Short-term Advertising Effect (λ0)  0.321 (1.148) 
Retention Rate (δ) 1.126 (0.552) 
 
Including Ads Spending of the Past 11 Months in the Regression of Equation (3-4) 
Short-term Advertising Effect (λ0)  1.570 (2.074) 
Retention Rate (δ) 0.849 (0.309) 
 
Including Ads Spending of the Past 10 Months in the Regression of Equation (3-4) 
Short-term Advertising Effect (λ0)  0.09 (0.412) 
Retention Rate (δ) 1.460 (0.911) 
 
Including Ads Spending of the Past 9 Months in the Regression of Equation (3-4) 
Short-term Advertising Effect (λ0)  0.104 (0.500) 
Retention Rate (δ) -1.832 (1.083) 
 
Including Ads Spending of the Past 8 Months in the Regression of Equation (3-4) 
Short-term Advertising Effect (λ0)  2.529 (1.823) 
Retention Rate (δ) 0.744 (0.266) 
 
Including Ads Spending of the Past 7 Months in the Regression of Equation (3-4) 
Short-term Advertising Effect (λ0)  2.550 (1.665) 
Retention Rate (δ) 0.777 (0.249) 
 
Including Ads Spending of the Past 6 Months in the Regression of Equation (3-4) 
Short-term Advertising Effect (λ0)  3.108 (1.751) 
Retention Rate (δ) 0.679 (0.301) 
  
Including Ads Spending of the Past 5 Months in the Regression of Equation (3-4) 
Short-term Advertising Effect (λ0) 3.364 (1.949) 
Retention Rate (δ) 0.626 (0.414) 
 
We include year and month effects in the model. Other covariates include state personal 
income per capita, state unemployment rate, share of population aged 18-21, share of 
population aged 22-29, share of population aged 30-44, share of population aged 45-65, 
share of white population, share of Black population, share of Hispanic population, share 
of population living in the central city or balance of the MSA area, share of population 
married, share of male population, share of population with some high school, share of 
population with high school diploma, share of population with some college, share of 
population with college diploma, linear, quadratic and cubic term of jackpot size of the 




Table 4-1     Summary Statistics of Selected Lottery States 
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Number of observations 189 315 168 105 
            
Sources: National Center fro Education Statistics 
  Bureau of Economic Analysis 
  U.S. Census Bureau 




Table 4-2     State Educational Revenue Per Capita Equations: K-12, Earmark Non-
Education and General Revenue Groups 
 















































     
F-test (p-value) on Hypothesis 









     
Bayesian Inferences     
     Prob (α1 < 1) 0.917 0.995 0.953 0.779 
     Prob (α1 > α2) 0.622 0.335 0.539 0.789 
     Prob (α2 > α3) 0.741 0.353 0.350 0.807 
     Prob (α3 > 0) 0.860 0.805 0.953 0.784 
     
     Prob (α1 > α2 > α3) 0.465 0.118 0.191 0.636 
     Prob (1 > α1 > α2  > α3) 0.391 0.116 0.165 0.441 
     Prob (1 > α1 > α2 > α3  > 0) 0.309 0.036 0.136 0.322 
     
N 672 640 576 512 
Fiscal Years 1978-98 1979-98 1981-98 1983-98 
 
In all models, we include state and year effects and in the fixed-effects model, we include 
state-specific time trends. Other covariates included in the regression are state personal 
income, the share of the population enrolled in K-12 schools, the share of the population 
aged 65+, the share of the population unemployed, the share of white population, the 
share of the population with some high school, the share of the population with high 
school diploma, the share of the population with some college, the share of the population 
with college diploma, a set of dummy variables for state educational finance reform, and 





Table 4-3     State Educational Revenue Per Capita Equations: Changers and General 
Revenue Groups 
 
















α1 (Lottery profits  











α2 (Lottery Profits 










     
F-test (p-value) on Hypothesis 









     
Bayesian Inferences:     
     Prob (α1 < 1) 0.811 0.732 0.718 0.772 
     Prob (α1 > α2) 0.877 0.969 0.886 0.869 
     Prob (1 > α1 > α2) 0.690 0.700 0.605 0.640 
     
N 441 420 378 336 
Fiscal Years 1978-98 1979-98 1981-98 1983-98 
 
In all models, we include state and year effects and in the fixed-effects model, we include 
state-specific time trends. Other covariates included in the regression are state personal 
income, the share of the population enrolled in K-12 schools, the share of the population 
aged 65+, the share of the population unemployed, the share of white population, the 
share of the population with some high school, the share of the population with high 
school diploma, the share of the population with some college, the share of the population 
with college diploma, a set of dummy variables for state educational finance reform, and 




 Table 4-4     Comparison of Impacts on State Educational Revenue of Alternative Sin 
Taxes 
 

























































     




































In all models, we include state and year effects and in the fixed-effects model, we include 
state-specific time trends. Other covariates included in the regression are state personal 
income, the share of the population enrolled in K-12 schools, the share of the population 
aged 65+, the share of the population unemployed, the share of white population, the 
share of the population with some high school, the share of the population with high 
school diploma, the share of the population with some college, the share of the population 
with college diploma, a set of dummy variables for state educational finance reform, and 




Table 4-5     Estimated Effects after Correction of Serial Correlation in Residuals  
 




Robust OLS  
 
K-12, Earmark Non-Education and General Revenue Groups 
 
α1  




















Changers and General Revenue Groups 
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In all models, we include state and year effects and in the fixed-effects model, we include 
state-specific time trends. Other covariates included in the regression are state personal 
income, the share of the population enrolled in K-12 schools, the share of the population 
aged 65+, the share of the population unemployed, the share of white population, the 
share of the population with some high school, the share of the population with high 
school diploma, the share of the population with some college, the share of the population 
with college diploma, a set of dummy variables for state educational finance reform, and 




Table 4-6     2SLS Estimates Using Lottery, Lotto Games (and Video Game), and 
Population of Counties with Casinos as Instruments 
 
Parameter Estimates and (Standard Errors) 
 
 
K-12 Group General Revenue Group 
 
2SLS Estimates 















































   
N 189 336 
 
In all models, we include state and year effects and in the fixed-effects model, we include 
state-specific time trends. Other covariates included in the regression are state personal 
income, the share of the population enrolled in K-12 schools, the share of the population 
aged 65+, the share of the population unemployed, the share of white population, the 
share of the population with some high school, the share of the population with high 
school diploma, the share of the population with some college, the share of the population 
with college diploma, a set of dummy variables for state educational finance reform, and 
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Table A-1 Fixed Effects Estimates for K-12 Group and Changers Group  
Pooled With General Revenue Group  
 
Parameter Estimates and (Standard Errors) 
 
Sub-sample 1 
Changers & General Revenue 
Groups 
Sub-sample 2 
K-12 & General Revenue 
Groups 
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Table A-1 Fixed Effects Estimates for K-12 Group and Changers Group  
Pooled With General Revenue Group (continued) 
 
Parameter Estimates and (Standard Errors) 
 
Sub-sample 1 
Changer & General Revenue 
Groups 
Sub-sample 2 
K-12 & General Revenue 
Groups 




































1 year after property tax 





2 year after property tax 





3 year after property tax 





4 year after property tax 





5 year after property tax 





6 year after property tax 









N 483 567 
States 23 27 
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